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Abstract	  
Freedom of speech and press freedom are key foundations of all human rights as stipulated in 
human rights declaration of 1948. Denying people the right to free speech is keeping them away 
from what is happening in this world, thus, hindering them from participating in decision 
making. While speech freedom and press freedom are key tools to measure if a country is 
democratically or despotically run, the right to freedom of expression in Rwanda is casualty of 
the horrible history of the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi in which media played a great deal. 
Using an explanatory research design and a non probability sampling with various 
qualitative methods such as interviews, personal observations and discourse analysis, the study 
confirmed a clear collaboration between the government and hate media in perpetrating the 
genocide. Research findings from both the field study and literature say the government having 
purposely manipulated media, and consequently inducing them in fuelling the genocide. Despite 
that shared responsibility between the government and media, only journalists and ordinary 
citizens are paying the price.  
In an endeavour to protect the society from the recidivism of the genocide, the 
Government of Rwanda (GoR) instituted a number of laws including the genocide ideology law 
and media laws, all of which castigate discrimination and sectarianism. Human rights 
organizations and activists, political opponents, media and some ordinary citizens quickly started 
to accuse these laws of being tools for the government to silence its critics while masquerading 
as perpetrators of national security. Field research findings and the rich literature of the study,  
however, suggest that only open debates, both public and in media, can protect national security 
and till respect people’s rights of free speech and press freedom.     
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0. GENERAL	  INTRODUCTION	  
	  
“It is not what media does to people, but what people do with media,” (Blumler and Katz 
1974:11). 
0.1. Background to the study 
The end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries were characterized by 
incredible hardship events of regional and international conflicts in which millions and millions 
of people lost their lives while others were left casualties and others displaced from their 
households and fled to live in refugee camps.  The most wicked of those conflicts are the 1994 
Tutsi Genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda that winded up lives of approximately a million of 
innocent people and the United States of America’s war against terrorism in the Middle East 
which killed approximately 140,000 civilians per year during the last 11 years (M. Reza Pirbhai, 
2012). The situation got worse with the development of the communication technology.  
The progress of communication technology was also remarkable in print media and 
broadcast media. The power of information has, during the 20th century, changed the mindset of 
people in both negative and positive ways. In the mid 1990s new considerations emerged about 
media development that specifically directed attention to the news media’s role in latent or overt 
conflict and in conflict resolution (Ross Howard: 2009:7). In 1994, Rwanda, a small little known 
country in Eastern Central Africa, even hard to find on the world map, choked the entire world 
with the outbreak of mass killings through which more than a million of its population, mostly of 
Tutsi ethnicity, perished. Many believe that propaganda and inflammatory “hate media” calling 
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for the extermination of the Tutsi ethnic minority played a significant role in fuelling the 
violence (BBC, 2003; Thompson, 2007).  
Due to the role of media in 1994 Genocide against Tutsi, the post Genocide Rwanda 
Government intensified media censorship, which did have some repercussions even on 
individuals’ freedom of opinion. In an endeavor to eradicate the genocide ideology and protect 
the society from awful hate media messages, they took a number of measures including the Law 
No. 47/2001 of December 18, 2001, instituting punishment for offences of discrimination and 
sectarianism and Law No. 18/2008 of July 23, which prohibits the incitement of genocide, 
among other things, ethnic affiliation. The statute is known as the “Genocide Ideology” Law. 
Shortly after this Genocide Ideology Law’s enactment, alarms went out in international 
human rights circles, both domestically and abroad, over concerns that the law’s vagueness 
would open it to potential abuse (Dalporto, 2012: 875).  According to Rwanda Speaks (2011), 
since April 2010, a vibrant period for the 2010 presidential elections, six Rwandese journalists 
have fled; two have been put in jail for a long period while two were shot dead. Critics accused 
the Rwandan government of having abused the law to quickly silence the opposition (Amnesty 
International, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2012).  
Without ignoring the particularity of history of Rwanda that justifies the restriction of 
press freedom and freedom of expression, this thesis deals with the issue of how political leaders 
might be exploiting genocide related laws to restrict fundamental human rights, particularly 
freedom of speech and press freedom. Tending to relate them with human security, the study 
explains the concepts of freedom of expression and press freedom. It also tackles the issue of 
freedom of expression and press freedom in unity and reconciliation in Rwanda.  
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Critics on the Genocide Ideology Law will help us to understand to what extent this law 
afflicts a free speech, particularly critics on the leadership of the country, thus, hindering 
citizens’ participation in political decision making. The thesis concludes recommending on how 
to protect people and sustain national security without necessarily imposing unnecessary 
restrictions on free speech.  
0.2. Relevance of the topic 
Freedom of speech, twin to press freedom, is one of the human rights and the cornerstone 
of the other human Rights. Therefore, without speech freedom, it would be illusive pretending to 
have human rights and peace. However, nearly two decades after the Genocide against Tutsi in 
Rwanda, the country has been repeatedly reported to silence the freedom of expression and press 
freedom. Media, political oppositions, human rights organizations and academicians view this as 
an obstacle to peace and reconciliation processes in this war and genocide torn country. This 
research aims, therefore, at exploring reasons for the Government of Rwanda to over control 
(censure) the free speech, consequences of that censorship and possible ways the country can be 
governed without severe restrictions of the free speech. 
0.3. Personal Justification 
The choice of this topic corresponds to my concern as a Rwandan and to both my former 
academic and work backgrounds. Being a Rwandan citizen who lived the tragic history the 
country went through and a Rwandan journalist, in particular, who exercises his career under the 
consequences of hate media on the whole Rwandan public opinion and on media in particular, 
has always challenged and affected me in one way or another. In the aftermath of the 1994 
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bloody tragedy in Rwanda that media toasted, it sounded clear that some restrictions on freedom 
of speech might be imposed.  
However, the question remains that of knowing to what extent and for how long must 
these restrictions hamper the freedom of press and freedom of opinion from media to individuals 
and from elderly people to small children? For example, Jean Leonard Rugambage, a journalist 
and a friend of mine was shot dead shortly before the 2010 presidential elections. Critics say he 
was killed investigating the attempt to assassinate a high profiled Rwandan military officer 
exiled in South Africa (Lillian Leposo, 2010:1). In 2006, a number of secondary school students, 
mainly minors of age, were expelled from schools, accused of genocide ideology (Amnesty 
International, 2010:11). Facing positively such issues could ease any hindrance to move toward 
sustainable reconciliation and long lasting peace. 
This study also comes as an awareness tool in human rights, especially in freedom of 
expression and press freedom as a cornerstone of the fundamental human rights. Eliciting the 
interrelatedness between press freedom and freedom of expression and human security will 
awake the consciousness of the consumers to stand for their rights. Being aware of possible 
unintended violations of human rights by some of the oppressors, this study describes the 
freedom of speech and press freedom in its legal boundaries and discusses different behaviors 
towards the violation of this vitally precious right. 
Many researchers have carried out research on the role of media in 1994 Tutsi Genocide 
in Rwanda, but few have dared to tackle the issue of the consequences of hate media on 
restrictions of freedom of expression and press freedom in the post genocide Rwanda. As 
freedom of expression and freedom of speech is one of the fundamental human rights, this study 
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will widely open doors to future scholars and researchers to navigate this area for the sake of 
creating a more viable and enjoyable, not only Rwanda, but the world. 
0.4. Scope of the study 
As freedom of speech and press freedom concern everybody in the society, this research 
engages all social groups in Rwanda. This implies, on the one hand, that children; youth; 
grownups; educated or uneducated; poor or rich have all experienced and still experience the 
benefit of enjoying their freedom of speech and freedom of press. On the other hand, they all 
have also suffered and still suffer from unnecessary restrictions on their free speech especially 
due to the negative history of Rwanda. 
Being consumers of censored information, they have been approached in their different 
institutions/environments to hear how they enjoy this fundamental human right. Specific 
questions have helped us to survey the level of enjoyment of this right and the level of its 
hindrance to people´s opinions in their everyday life. Media houses, journalists’ associations, 
human rights and academicians have had a big say along this study. For the sake of the balance 
of the study, views from government officials in charge of media such as the Rwanda 
Governance Board (RGB), and the Media High Council (HCM) have been also incorporated in 
this study. 
For media houses, the researcher carried out interviews with Pax Press, a local 
organization which operates as both an NGO and a News Agency. Pax Press promotes 
democracy, good governance, and citizens’ participation.  With eight years operating in Rwanda 
in collaboration with Syfia International News Agency, and given their editorial line, the 
researcher assumes that they have built some sort of expertise that can contribute to this research 
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with credible information. As this organization works with many journalists, the choice of 
respondents will base on their experience in media. Respondents have been selected from 
journalists with more than five years in this career. 
On the side of journalists’ associations, the Network of Journalists for Protection of 
Human Rights (NJPH) and the Rwanda Media Commission (RMC), an organization that is in 
charge of media self regulation, will be approached. The researcher´s motivation to interview 
NJPH Rights came from the fact that this is the only journalists´ association which has as main 
objective the protection of human rights including journalists´ rights. On the other hand RMC is 
a newly created institution as the Government of Rwanda wanted to discharge from media 
regulation and hand the future of media into media practitioners’ hands. Linking this research 
with this media regulatory body´s objectives, vision and projects helped us understanding the 
direction in which Rwanda media could take Rwandans. Instead of interviewing the leader of 
this one year old institution, the research used his views from the meeting with local government 
authorities in the Western Province that aimed at disseminating the Access to Information Law. 
The researcher also used his views in different radio programs and newspaper reports. 
0.5. Statement of the problem 
The 1994 Genocide against Tutsi has been the most bloodshed and horrific event since 
the WWII. The size of Rwanda-smaller than the State of Maryland, her divisive history, her 
mono-linguistic nature and biased hate media made easy the escalation of destructive messages, 
thus, preparing the ground for the genocide perpetrators. For Ross Howard (2009), one impetus 
for this new focus was the clearly negative role of the media in major social catastrophes, such as 
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the incitement and direction played by indigenous media in the genocidal killings in Rwanda in 
1994 and in policies and acts of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia.  
In 1993, one year before the 1994 Genocide, some of the members of the Government of 
Rwanda (GoR) of that time and their partisan businesspeople started RTLM (Radio Television 
Libre de Milles Collines) with intention to spread the messages of hatred against Tutsi. While 
newspapers and magazines spread the message in urban areas among the small portion of the 
population that was highly literate, the perpetrators employed radio broadcasting to sow hatred 
and distrust among the much larger rural population, as well as the unemployed youth of Kigali 
(Frank Chalk, 1997).  
Chalk says that RTLM whipped up fear and ethnic hatred more effectively than Radio 
Rwanda-the Government owned radio-ever had, using dynamic, innovative programming which 
introduced to Rwanda’s airways for the first time a unique cocktail of the liveliest African music 
and informal talk radio, blended with culturally-coded attacks on Tutsi and their defenders. 
Enormously popular and widely heard, Radio RTLM severely damaged the bonds of solidarity 
between Hutu and Tutsi, people who lived and farmed together as neighbours on almost each of 
Rwanda’s thousands of hills.  
Due to the negative image Rwanda media inherited from hate media and to the legacy of 
divisive political discourses, numerous measures to limit free speech in Rwanda have been 
introduced after the genocide for the sake of avoiding further divisionism and mass killings. 
Some of those measures are genocide related laws and media laws which scholars, opposition 
parties and human rights organizations criticize to be ambiguous. Therefore, given gaps in those 
laws, those organizations claim that people do not express freely fearing to be punished under 
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such laws. Some opposition parties, the civil society and the international community view these 
laws as being tools for the GoR to shut down any criticism and impede any opposition. 
This thesis will, therefore, critically study the role of hate media in 1994 Genocide and 
their impact on human rights in Rwanda with emphasis on freedom of speech and press freedom. 
Greater emphasis will be put on RTLM and Kangura to see how the role of these divisionism-
motivated media affects media operations in Rwanda today. Knowing whether their editorial 
lines were due to the excess of press freedom and free speech (libertarianism) or whether they 
were politically motivated and manipulated (authoritarianism) will help us understanding to what 
extent the freedom of speech should be limited in a post conflict environment and to what extent 
should the restriction of media freedom affect the individuals’ free speech. 
Despite the negative role of media in 1994 Genocide against Tutsi, ignoring possible 
manipulations by the genocidal government that might have used them as a tool to quickly 
spread their ideology would induce the country in a fatal error. Howard (2009) articulates that it 
was realized that states with authoritarian governments and proliferating media could make 
untrained or irresponsible journalists more liable to participate in manipulating public opinion for 
gross abuse of human rights and the reversal of democratization.  
The correlation between hate media and genocidal leadership will, therefore, be discussed 
along the study. The study will also discuss the issues of speech freedom and democracy and the 
impact of freedom of speech and press freedom in unity and reconciliation in Rwanda. Given the 
double standard role of media in destroying and rebuilding Rwanda, the study will also have a 
look at the relationship between the current GoR and media. As media freedom involves free 
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speech, the study will also examine how the GoR deals with individuals’ opinions on sensitive 
issues such as ethnicity related issues, governance and resources redistribution. 
0.6. Research questions 
This study will be guided by the following questions: 
1. What consequences did the role of hate media in the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi have 
on freedom of speech and press freedom in Rwanda? 
2. What was the relationship between the genocidal government and hate media?  
3. What lessons did Rwanda media professionals and media practitioners learn from hate 
media? 
4. What did the post genocide GoR learn from the relationship between the genocidal 
government and hate media? 
5. How could the Rwandan Government secure its national security without severely 
restricting the right to free speech and press freedom? 
0.7. Objectives of the study 
The main objective of this study is to analyze the consequences of the genocide and hate 
media on human rights in Rwanda, especially freedom of speech and press freedom. The study 
will analyze the role of media in 1994 Genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda with emphasis on hate 
media. It will tend to evaluate different steps undertaken by the post genocide Rwanda media to 
avoid the recidivism of fatal errors committed by their fellow pioneers. It will also have a look at 
the relationship between human security and freedom of speech and the relationship between 
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governance and free speech and press freedom with intent to recommend the GoR on how to 
regulate media without necessarily imposing restrictions on free speech.  
0.8. METHODOLOGY  
Given the nature of the problem this study was exploring, it required more qualitative 
data than quantitative. A qualitative research helped us understanding the consumption of press 
freedom and freedom of expression in Rwanda and how it affects or has affected consumers in 
the period prior and post genocide. The study required interviews and discourse analysis of hate 
media and propaganda messages before and during the genocide. This has led us to 
understanding reasons behind the status of speech freedom and press freedom in Rwanda. 
0.8.1. Research design 
This study required an exploratory research because though many studies have been 
carried out on hate media in Rwanda Genocide against Tutsi, few to none dared to relate this 
issue to the current situation of Rwanda regarding speech freedom and human security. As this 
research examines repercussions of war journalism that has been practiced by hate media during 
the 1994 Genocide, the exploratory research will serve as catalysis to other media, peace and 
conflict researchers to carry further researches on this particular issue. 
For the sampling design, the study has been carried out in Kigali City where we could 
find a large concentration of media, Human Rights Organizations and easily find other 
respondents needed for the survey.   The study used, however, discussions from the meeting that 
gathered journalists, local government officials, the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) and the 
Rwanda Media Commission to explain and disseminate the Access to Information Law. As the 
study targets media, human rights organizations, political parties, the civil society, government 
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officials and individuals, the research tried hard to find qualitative data through interviews, group 
discussions, meetings and some official documents. This helps us understanding the current 
situation of speech freedom and press freedom in Rwanda and the consequences of its exercise 
on people’s everyday lives.  As a sampling frame, every respondent was either recorded during 
the interview or handed in an answer sheet. Meetings and radio programs from which the 
researcher borrowed data for this study have been also recorded. 
0.8.2. Methods of sampling 
This research required a non-probability sampling method. In different forms of this 
method of sampling, a purposive sampling was estimated to be more effective. This means that 
though anybody can provide information to this study, those who can answer well the questions 
related to the study were given more chance to be interviewed. The choice depended on the 
experience in one’s position. For this reason, respondents were chosen from journalists with 
more than five years of experience in this career and from Human Rights activists with at least 7 
years in this domain.  
 0.8.3. Data collection methods and tools 
For data collection, a range of combined techniques have been used. The study mainly 
needed semi-structured interviews: individual in-depth interviews and group discussions. 
However, depending on the availability of respondents and data, it also required questionnaires 
for the sake of collecting as much data as possible. Secondary sources and personal observations 
have been also used to enrich the study. Depending on the data collection methods, the 
appropriate data collection tools for this study were interview schedules, questionnaires, a voice 
recorder and an observation schedule. 
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0.8.4. Data analysis and interpretation techniques 
For data analysis and interpretation, all data deemed worth for the study have been taken 
into consideration and commented one by one. However, in case of similar views the researcher 
has preferred to use the strongest and mention the percentage of respondents who share that 
viewpoint. Every answer from various respondents has been carefully read and analyzed 
compared to both the initial statement of the problem and to the objectives of the study. 
0.8.5. Organization of the work 
This thesis is divided into five main parts: the general introduction, four chapters and the 
conclusions and recommendations. 
The general introduction briefly looks at the background of press freedom and freedom of 
expression. It takes us to look backward in history of media and freedom of expression to give us 
a clear idea of how press freedom, freedom of expression, human security and human rights 
interrelate. It also analyses different reports classifying countries according to their fulfillment of 
free speech as a fundamental human right. It further explores reasons why Rwanda is classified 
among the last country in respecting human rights, particularly freedom of speech. 
Chapter one provides a conceptual and theoretical framework of the study. In this 
chapter, relevant concepts to the study, such as press freedom, freedom of expression, 
information, information of the public interest, security, human security, democracy, 
sovereignty, etc are defined to facilitate readers to understand well and precisely the content of 
the study. Communication theories concerned with the press freedom and freedom of expression, 
in this chapter, also help us understanding metaphors of political narratives used to contain the 
public opinion. 
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Chapter two looks at specific theories of international relations in order to explain how 
the position of a country in respecting and fulfilling the freedom of expression and press freedom 
influences how the country is perceived in international relations. It describes democracy and its 
bonds with free speech and press freedom and incites us to raise awareness and remind political 
authorities that violating the right of free speech is violating all human rights as human rights are 
indivisible, inalienable and universal. 
Chapter three provides a brief overview of the history of media in Rwanda from pre to 
post genocide. It addresses the role of media in 1994 Tutsi Genocide, especially hate media and 
analyze what could have happened if there were free speech and press freedom in Rwanda before 
and during the darkness of the genocide. It raises a debate of knowing whether the role of media 
in 1994 Tutsi Genocide was due to freedom of speech and press freedom or to the lack of this 
vitally important right. This debate would take us to a critical analysis of the current operation of 
media in Rwanda, thus leading us to the prediction of where press freedom and freedom of 
speech are taking Rwanda. 
Along this chapter, we look at laws that scholars, political oppositions and human rights 
criticize to be at the forefront of hindering Rwandans from fully enjoying their basic human 
rights including right to information and free opinions. Among those laws, the thesis specifically 
looks at the constitution of Rwanda, media laws and genocide related laws.  
Chapter four delimits the field research; analyzes them and present research findings and 
interpretations of the research findings while the last part deals with the conclusion, 
recommendations and future lines of research. In this chapter, relevant sources such as media 
houses, professional journalists, human rights activists and organizations and government 
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officials and institutions have been approached to share their say about press freedom and speech 
freedom and how the way these freedoms are exercised may affect or affects individual 
freedoms. 
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CHAPTER	  I:	  	  CONCEPTUAL	  AND	  THEORETICAL	  FRAMEWORK	  
I.0. Introduction 
Speech freedom, press freedom and human security are key concepts to this research. To 
clearly have the image of what this research is about, one needs to understand these concepts, 
their contextualization and their limitations. Given their complex nature, related concepts, such 
as freedom of expression, security, human rights, governance and democracy that are used in this 
research have been explained to help readers to understand this study. 
Due to a large number of concepts that need to be defined to facilitate the reader to 
understand the content of the study, some definitions are brief. As this research also relates to 
many theories and models, the research does not talk exhaustively about all these theories. 
Elements of the theories that are very close to the study and captivate the reader’s mind were 
used in this study. 
I.1. Definition of Key Concepts 
I.1.1.	  Press	  Freedom	  	  
Freedom of the press originates from the fundamental right of freedom of information. 
The resolution 59 (I) of the General Assembly of the United Nations of  December 14, 1946, 
stated that freedom of information is fundamental human rights  and is the touchstone of all the 
freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated. Freedom of information implies the right 
to gather, transmit and publish news anywhere and everywhere without fetters. As such, it is an 
essential factor in any serious effort to promote peace and progress of the world (UN, 1946). 
Given the definition above, a country that does not guarantee the speech freedom to its people 
cannot claim to have peace and development. 
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Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts this freedom by stressing 
that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
any media and regardless of frontiers”. Marina Guseva et al. (2007) views the Press Freedom as 
an intermediary between individuals and government, informing the latter of people’s needs and 
acting as a buffer against crises and situations of extreme deprivation.  It holds governments 
accountable and makes their actions more transparent; and, along with other indicators of good 
governance, it creates a business-enabling environment, a climate conducive to more effective 
public affairs management, and so forth (Marina Guseva ,et al, 2008:5). 
Guseva brings in the importance of the free flow of ideas to societies to promote mutual 
respect and mutual understanding and to facilitate the sharing of knowledge. As it is through 
information flow that people share knowledge, hindering information circulation affects the 
knowledge sharing process and this may cut or delay the learning process. International 
agreements and institutions such as UNESCO make it possible to uphold such free ﬂow of words 
and images (Marina Guseva et al, 2007:14). The mandate of UNESCO as set out in its 1945 
Constitution specifically calls on the Organization to “promote the free flow of ideas by word 
and image”.  
Ahuja, B. N (2004) defines press freedom as the mass media’s unquestionable right to 
discuss whatever is not explicitly forbidden by law, including the wisdom of any restrictive 
statute. Jens Barland (2005) insists on the press’ independence of interference from any external 
interests. According to the latter, the attention is most of all given to how political authorities 
give the press space and freedom to play its autonomous role. John Stuart Mill (1859) brings in 
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the idea of liberalism with emphasis on plurality, including the right to be wrong and make 
mistakes. While Mill agrees with the fact that there is no absolute truth, he qualifies the right to 
freedom of expression as one of the most sacred needs.  
For Ogundimu, Folu (2002), in terms of democracy, a major point is that press freedom 
belongs to the public, not to the media corporate. He argues that if information is a public good, 
a necessity for democratic processes, the purpose for press freedom is that the press should get 
conditions to serve the public (Folu, 2002:58).  
I.1.2.	  Freedom	  of	  Expression	  
Barland (2007) calls press freedom a twin of freedom of expression, which is a 
cornerstone in democracy. He states that concepts of press freedom and freedom of expression 
seem to overlap almost completely. In fact, threatening press freedom implies restricting the 
public’s freedom to information and free speech- one of the most precious human rights as 
mentioned above. According to Human Rights Education Associates (HREA) (2003), freedom of 
expression is a cornerstone of democratic rights and freedoms. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Article 19, stipulates that everyone has the right to the freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through and media and regardless of frontiers.  
HREA  reminds that in its very first session in 1946, before any human rights 
declarations or treaties had been adopted, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 59(I) 
stating "Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and [...] the touchstone of all the 
freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated." The constitution of Rwanda also 
recognizes this right as it states in its Article 11 that  
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All Rwandans are born and remain free and equal in rights and duties. Discrimination of 
whatever kind based on, inter alia, ethnic origin, tribe, clan, color, sex, region, social 
origin, religion or faith, opinion, economic status, culture, language, social status, 
physical or mental disability or any other form of discrimination is prohibited and 
punishable by law. 
Freedom of expression and the free flow of information, including free and open debate 
regarding matters of public interest, even when this involves criticism of individuals, are of 
crucial importance in a democratic society, for the personal development, dignity and fulfillment 
of every individual, as well as for the progress and welfare of society, and the enjoyment of other 
human rights and fundamental freedoms (Global Campaign for Free Press Expression, 2000:3). 
As a fundamental right, it should be put on the agenda of the rights to be urgently promoted to 
give a chance to citizens’ participation in shaping their future.   
However, though there may be certain extreme forms of expression such as “hate speech” 
which need to be curtailed for the protection of other human rights, condition under which this 
censorship is opted for should be clear. Otherwise, it could sound like the “law of the jungle” 
where the idea of the most powerful comes at the forefront.  Michael J. Prince (2005) put it well 
presenting about Democracy and Social Justice in the British Columbia where he recalls in the 
Throne Speech the government saying, “We can open up new worlds of possibility if we have 
access to information and facts needed to make informed decisions,”( Prince, 2005:6). This gives 
a sign of the will of forming an inclusive society where grassroots communities are given a say 
in the decision making process unlikely the traditional and oppressive top down process through 
which only leaders make policies and impose them to  their “subjects”. 
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Nonetheless, freedom of speech and freedom of opinion can sometimes be tricky. 
Chomsky (1998) puts it well that the smart way to keep people passive and obedient is to strictly 
limit the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate within that spectrum—
even encourage the more critical and dissident views. That gives people the sense that there’s 
free thinking going on, while all the time the presuppositions of the system are being reinforced 
by the limits put on the range of the debate, (Chomsky, 1998:3). 
 
I.1.3.	  Information	  	  
“Information” means any original or copy of documentary material irrespective of its 
physical characteristics, and any other tangible or intangible material, regardless of the form or 
medium in which it is held. It includes, but is not limited to, records, correspondence, facts, 
opinion, advice, memoranda, data, statistics, books, drawings, plans, maps, diagrams, 
photographs, audio or visual records, documents, emails, logbooks, samples, models, and data 
held in any electronic form (source). “Information of public interest” refers to information that is 
of concern or benefit to the public, not merely of individual interest and whose disclosure is “in 
the interest of the public,” for instance, because it is useful for public understanding of 
government activities. 
The word information in the Mathematical Theory of Communication is used in a special 
way that must not be confused with its ordinary usage. Shannon (1964) argues that information 
must not be confused with meaning. He claims that two messages, one of which is heavily 
loaded with meaning and other of which is pure nonsense, can be exactly equivalent from the 
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present viewpoint, as regards information, (Fannon&Weaver, 1964:8). To Fannon, the semantic 
aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering aspects.  
However, he later says the word information in communication theory relates not so 
much to what you do say, as to what it could say. That is why Weaver, describes information as a 
measure of one’s freedom of choice when one selects a message (Weaver, 1964:9). The latter 
argues that if one is confronted with a very elementary situation where he has to choose one of 
the two alternative messages, then it is arbitrarily said the information, associated with this 
situation, is unity. Weaver assumes that it is misleading, although often convenient, that one or 
the other message conveys unity information. 
He, thus, concludes that the concept of information applies not to the individual message 
(as the concept of meaning would), but rather to the situation as a whole, the unit information 
indicating that in this situation one has an amount of freedom of choice in selecting a message, 
which it is convenient to regard as a standard or unit amount (Weaver, 1964:9). 
 
I.1.4.	  Information	  of	  public	  interest	  
 
According to global principles on national security and the right to information (2013), 
information of public interest refers to information that is of concern or benefit to the public, not 
merely of individual interest and whose disclosure is “in the interest of the public,” for instance, 
because it is useful for public understanding of government activities. 
I.1.5.	  Human	  security	  
To understand the concept of human security we need, first, to understand the traditional 
concept of security and its twin sisters of national security and state sovereignty. Contextualizing 
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these concepts will lead us to a debate regarding the significance of human security in the 
academic field, particularly in peace and security studies.  
I.1.6.	  Security	  
The concept of security is defined in various ways according to circumstances, but no 
matter the situation all definitions are centered on freedom from fear and safety. The Oxford 
Dictionary defines it as the state of feeling safe, stable, and free from fear or anxiety. It also 
refers to procedures followed or measures taken to ensure the security of a state or organization. 
Barry Buzan defines security as the management of threat. According to him it is often thought 
of as the pursuit of freedom from threat, though whether individuals or states would actually 
want to live in a threat-free environment is an interesting question with no clear or absolute 
answer as for states, a threat-free environment would threaten the principal raison d’etre of the 
state, which is provision of security. States and/or governments, may therefore need, or prefer to 
have, at least some level of threat. 
Security is the key function of the state: because the state is foundational to the provision of 
order, it has its own claim to a right of survival and self-defense which is different from the 
sum of the individual rights to security of its citizens (and may up to a point be contradictory 
with them: e.g. conscription). The key point to note is that when the state is both referent 
object and principal provider of security, this gives a strong territorial and state-centric 
framing to both the definition of threats and the provision of security (Barry Buzan, 2007).  
I.1.7.	  Human	  security	  
Human Security is a new but emerging concept in today´s new world order. According to 
Human Security Initiative (2011), Human Security focuses primarily on protecting people while 
promoting peace and assuring sustainable continuous development. With a people-centered 
approach, Human Security helps individuals to resolve inequalities that affect security. However, 
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critics accuse it of encompassing and failing to achieve its ambitious goals for improving the 
human condition. Human Security Initiative argues that security has gone global as it is no 
longer simply related to the security of nation states. “The security of the individual now directly 
impacts the security of the state and vice versa”.  
Human Rights and Good Governance are the most key concepts of Human Security, and 
are interdependent. While Human rights are the rights and freedoms to which all humans are 
entitled, the resolution 2000/64 of the Commission on Human Rights identified the following 
key attributes of good governance: transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and 
responsiveness to the needs of the people (Human Rights Initiative, 2011:1). It insists that 
Human rights principles set the content of good governance such as a legislative framework and 
policies and likewise, good governance ensures the rightful implementation of human rights. 
According to Werthes and Debiel (2006:8), ‘human security provides a powerful 
“political leitmotif” for particular states and multilateral actors by fulfilling selected functions in 
the process of agenda-setting, decision-making and implementation’. With the emergence of 
human security, there is a mind shift of what is traditionally viewed as security from the national 
or state level to human beings as the potential victims; beyond physical violence as the only 
relevant threat/vector; and beyond physical harm as the only relevant damage (Des Gasper, 
2008:2). 
Gasper discusses ‘Human security’ at different scales and with reference to threats of 
varying scope. Moving from broad to narrow: it can be, according to him, first, treated as the 
security of the human species, or second, as the security of human individuals. Third, it may 
focus on severe priority threats to individuals, as judged perhaps by mortality impacts, or by the 
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degree of felt disquiet (which must be an important variable in explanatory analysis even if not 
always so in normative analysis). Fourth, the severe priority threats may be limited to ‘freedom 
from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’, or fifthly, to only the latter. More narrowly still, sixthly, 
some authors wish to consider only threats to individuals that are brought through violence, or by 
organized intentional violence, or, the narrowest conception yet (MacFarlane and Khong 2006: 
245-7), only the threats to physical survival brought about through organized intentional 
violence. 
The Components and Roles of the Idea and Discourse of Human Security 
ISSUE AREAS   GASPER 2005 (& 2007a, 2007b)   WERTHES-BOSOLD 2005-6-7 
Roles of an idea /discourse 
 
1.  To provide a shared language, 
for shared and mutually supportive 
investigation 
2.  To guide evaluations 
3.  To guide positive analysis 
4.  To focus attention in policy 
design 
5.  To motivate 
Multiple roles of an intellectual 
framework: 
(Werthes & Debiel: 12) 
1. Explanation and orientation 
2. Coordination and action-
related decision guidance  
3. Motivation and mobilization 
1 – To provide a shared language 
 
Besides a concept, ‘human 
security’ is also: 
- A discourse, whose elements are 
asterisked below 
- * A striking and evocative label 
Within this shared language 
people can flexibly respond to 
their own situation and policy 
projects, par excellence 
illustrated in the [Human 
Security Network]’ (Werthes & 
Bosold 2006: 23). 
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2 – Provides a focus for looking 
at effects; this guides evaluations 
and analysis (to determine; what 
is security?) 
 
A normative focus on individuals’ 
lives, viz: 
* Focus on individuals’ reasoned 
freedoms 
* A concern for stability as well as 
levels 
(italics indicate extensions beyond 
Human 
Development Approach) 
 
 
(a) From state focus to individual 
focus; this is the first of Werthes 
& Bosold’s four elements of a 
proposed shared core, 2006:25; 
also Bosold & Werthes 2005: 
99). 
Such rhetoric provides one 
instrument for holding its users 
accountable (Werthes &Bosold 
2006) 
 
 
2* - Human focus   
 
 
* JUF: ‘Joined-up feeling’, for all 
individuals – this is the spirit of 
human rights (HRs) discourse 
 
(b) ‘ People should have the 
opportunity tolive decently and 
without threats to their survival’ 
[Humanity]   
 
Edson: ‘human security is about 
protecting the common good’ 
(2001: 84) 
 
Who decides what is security 
and what is a threat? 
 
Not necessarily only the state 
(though that is one major actor). 
Can be individuals, groups, … 
 
3 – Provides a principle for 
considering causes: it guides 
analysis 
* JUT: ‘Joined-up thinking’   Greatly expanded scope of 
analytical attention 
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4 – Provides a focus for policy 
response 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prioritizing (which is inherent in 
the ‘security’ label): 
* A focus on basic needs 
* Basic rights for all. 
At the same time, Joined-up 
thinking? broad policy 
response,and: 
awareness of impossibility of full 
knowledge of relevant factors ? a 
deliberative, learningstyle in policy 
(Truong 2005). 
 
Policy style: 
(1) the large normative frame can 
influence other policy too 
(Werthes & Bosold 2006: 23); 
promote coherence; 
(2) impossibility of unilateral 
control [their point c; 2006:25] 
→’Safety threats must be 
addressed through multilateral 
processes…and by taking into 
account the patterns of 
interdependence that characterize 
the globalized world in which we 
are living’ [point d; Bosold & 
Werthes 2005: 89, 99]. Gropas 
supports the point on basic 
rights. 
Whose responsibility to respond? Not necessarily only the state, 
which may lack the capacity 
 
5 - Motivation   
 
 
Focus on basic needs and rights, 
including through an evocative 
label and concern for stability→ 
stronger motivational basis, 
mobilizing attention and concern: 
sustaining Joined-up Feeling 
Werthes & Bosold (2006: 32): 
the focus on individuals appeals 
to a broader range of actors, not 
to states alone. 
 
What relation to discourses of 
development? 
Goes further than discourses of 
human development, in the areas 
indicated above in italics 
 
What relation to discourses of 
need? 
Relies on a notion of need, as 
reasoned fundamental priority 
 
What relation to discourses of 
human rights? 
 
Basic rights for all 
 
No attention? 
(And nearly all the human rights 
literature does not refer to human 
security.) 
Koffi Annan’s conception of human security briefly sums up what is described in the above 
table. According to him, human security can no longer be understood in pure military words. 
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The demands we face also reflect a growing consensus that collective security can no 
longer be narrowly defined as the absence of armed conflict, be it between or within 
States. Gross abuses of  human rights, the large-scale displacement of civilian 
populations, international terrorism, the AIDS pandemic, drug and arms trafficking and 
environmental disasters present a direct threat to human security, forcing us to adopt a 
much more coordinated approach to a range of issues (Kofi Annan, 2001:1). 
I.1.8.	  Human	  Rights	  
The Business Dictionary defines human rights as the fundamental rights that humans 
have by the fact of being human, and that are neither created nor can be abrogated by any 
government. As found in several international conventions and treaties such as the United 
Nation's Universal Declaration of Human rights in 1948, those rights include cultural, economic, 
and political rights, such as right to life, liberty, education and equality before law, and right of 
association, belief, free speech, information, religion, movement, and nationality.  
According to Australian Development Agency (ADA), 2010, not only are they 
effectively embodied as the supreme legal norms in the constitutions of all nations in this world, 
but by adopting – and to a varying extent – ratifying international human rights treaties, all 
nations have committed themselves under international law to respecting, protecting and 
fulfilling these fundamental rights of human beings (Australian Development Agency (ADA), 
2010). As observed in Human Rights Standards: Learning from Experience (2006), the adoption 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948  led to the creation of an 
unprecedented number of standards to  protect human dignity. The most significant are the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966), which provided the 
foundation of the international legal framework that protects human rights. These two Covenants 
27	  
	  
together with the UDHR form the International Bill of Human Rights (Human Right Standards: 
Learning form Experience, 2006:1). 
 Other major human rights treaties, observed in the above document, include the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD, 
1965); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW, 1979);  the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT, 1984); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 1989); 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (ICMW, 1990) ; and the International Labor Organization (ILO) also 
adopted numerous human rights conventions on non-discrimination, forced labor, child labor, 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, and indigenous and tribal populations.  
The universal declaration of human rights, in its preamble, puts the freedom of speech 
and human security on the same scale claiming it to be the aspiration of the population. It states 
that whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall 
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the 
highest aspiration of the common people.  
I.1.9.	  National	  security	  
The United States (US) Department of Defense (2005) defines national security as a 
collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. 
Specifically, the condition provided by: a) a military or defense advantage over any foreign 
nation or group of nations; b) a favorable foreign relations position; or c) a defense posture 
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capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or 
covert. Though defined by the US, the definition applies or may apply in the context of any 
country or any nation state. National security refers to the protection of a nation from attack or 
other danger by holding adequate armed forces and guarding state secrets (US Legal Definitions, 
2001). In this context, national security goes beyond the protection of a nation’s “physical 
security” or protection against armed conflicts and embraces the protection of information coined 
under state secrets. 
The definition points out the area of concern of national security such as economic 
security, monetary security, energy security, environmental security, military security, political 
security and security of energy and natural resources. However, in US, the term relates only to 
those activities which are directly concerned with the nation's safety, as distinguished from the 
general welfare whereas in some other countries including Rwanda, it goes beyond to affect the 
everyday peoples´ lives (Transparency International, 2008).  
Traditionally, according to Buzan (2007), national security has been about the survival of 
the state against military threats posed by other states and this legacy continues to color the 
meaning of national security, both in terms of threats being existential, and in a strong emphasis 
on military threats and responses. Buzan claims that because of this legacy, the rhetorical force 
of ‘national security’ can be used to justify exceptional measures such as the use of force, 
suspension of civil liberties, secrecy, increase of executive powers, extra-legal activity in a way 
that other types of security (principally social security) cannot. The late 90s invasion of DRC by 
Rwanda inasmuch as the legitimate defense against Democratic Forces for The Liberation of 
Rwanda (FDRL) and the law authorizing instituted by the GoR to monitor peoples´ private 
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correspondences including phone calls, new technologies such as emails and website visits 
(Rising Continent, 2012).  
Nonetheless, according to Buzan (2007) national security in this sense should presuppose 
a strong state where government and society may enjoy a high degree of consensual integration. I 
agree with Buzan that the concept of national security is difficult to apply to weak states (low 
integration between government and society and high levels of coercion) because “feuding parts 
will make their own security claims against each other”.  
I.1.10.	  Legitimate	  National	  Security	  Interest	  
          The global principles on national security and the right to information refers it to an 
interest the genuine purpose and primary impact of which is to protect national security, 
consistent with international and national law. 
          The global principles on national security and the right to information insist that a national 
security interest is not legitimate if its real purpose or primary impact is to protect an interest 
unrelated to national security, such as protection of government or officials from embarrassment 
or exposure of wrongdoing; concealment of information about human rights violations, any other 
violation of law, or the functioning of public institutions; strengthening or perpetuating a 
particular political interest, party, or ideology; or suppression of lawful protests. 
I.1.11.	  Democracy	  	  
Zakaria (1997) argued that democracy, narrowly defined as free and fair elections, 
without ‘‘constitutional liberalism’’ is ‘‘dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the 
abuse of power, ethnic division, and even war.’’ He defines constitutional liberalism as 
protections of ‘‘the individual’s right to life and property, and freedom of religion and speech’’ 
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(Zakaria, 1997:6). I, however, disagree with Zakaria that freedom of speech, particularly when 
manifested as freedom of the press without democracy, is also dangerous because it provides 
information and a platform for expressing dissent without any other institutional outlets for 
dissent, such as political competition, political participation, and executive constraints.  
There are two things here that need to be clearly distinguished from freedom of speech 
and freedom of expression. Freedom of expression as above explained can be understood in the 
same way as freedom of speech and/or freedom of opinion. This means that everyone has the 
right to say what he/she thinks without fearing any threat. However, freedom of press relates to 
the freedom of media and media practitioners to get access to information and publish and/ or 
broadcast regardless any border and without fear.  
On the other hand democracy is different from liberalism and, of course, qualifying it as 
dangerous because it gives a way through to liberalism sounds awkward as dictators as well 
violate democracy principles inasmuch as they are avoiding anarchy. Should we revive the 
“animal farm era” where some people are more people than others? Should we keep the principle 
that the reason of the most powerful is always the best? How could we incorporate that 
humanness, imbedded in human rights, if the world is to be run by some, viewing others as 
valueless creatures and not really human beings?  However, democracy, viewed in terms of free 
speech and press freedom would open a society to constructive debates.  
Having clearly understood the concepts related to press freedom, freedom of expression 
and the concept of human security, the next step is to go a little bit thorough and put them into 
the theoretical context.  Where it applies, I will critically look at the praxis of these key concepts 
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of human rights in reshaping a sense of life in Rwanda after a sour experience of the 1994 
Genocide against Tutsis. 
I.2. Theoretical Framework and Rationale   
I.2.1.	  Democracy	  and	  public	  opinion	  
“There is not a more mean, stupid, selfish, pitiful, spiteful, envious, ungrateful animal than the 
Public,” William Hazlitt, Philosopher  
 
The issue of freedom of opinion has been and still is crucial even in the so called 
democratic societies. To this end, Alexander Hamilton (1970) has a skeptical view of a direct 
democracy which he considers both a "disease" and a "poison.” Hamilton’s skepticism expresses 
reservations about putting government in the hands of the common people. Thomas Jefferson 
walks in the same direction as Hamilton.  In 1816, he wrote to a friend: "We both consider the 
people as our children. But you love them as infants whom you are afraid to trust without nurses; 
and I as adults whom I freely leave to self-government."  
It is a shame that some of today´s elites, particularly in developing countries, still find 
Hamilton and Jefferson´s assertion relevant. The latter reminds me of a decade that followed the 
1994 Genocide tragedy in Rwanda. In those years, each and every student who was admitted to 
pursue his/her higher studies in public teaching institutions were obliged to take two to three 
months of civic and military education before resuming their studies.   
During this course in 2004, I realized a very different world from my everyday living. 
Military trainers used to tell us in Kiswahili (a military language in Rwanda): “Afande anapanga, 
mwanacourse anatumika,” to mean the military officer plans and the trainee (the ordinary 
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soldier/student in this case) executes.  Students were allowed neither to think for themselves nor 
to give their opinions during military sessions. Doing so sounded disobedience to the officers’ 
orders and could subject the trainee to heavy punishment such as crawling, kneeling down in 
small stones, beatings, etc. Nevertheless, this was a military course and it is fine to aspirants of 
the military career given the responsibilities awaiting them. But should this apply to the ordinary 
people/ civilian? Should anyone be threatened for his/her ideas and opinions? If yes, by whom? 
for what reasons? in which conditions?   
Walter Lippmann (1955), one of the influential journalists of the twentieth century 
estimates democracies as inevitably decay. He advocates for an unrestricted opinion. According 
to him, statesmanship requires wisdom, patience, discipline, deep knowledge of national and 
world affairs, and willingness to weigh the long-range consequences of an act against its 
immediate benefits--virtues that the public lacks. Nevertheless, Lippmann admits that popular 
opinion and enlightened leadership invariably face each other. On the one hand, doubters argue 
that the public was often “destructively wrong at [...] critical junctures" of American history and 
was sufficiently powerful that politicians had no choice except to "placate, appease, bribe, 
seduce, bamboozle, or...manipulate" their constituents (Lippmann, 1955:20). He insists that this 
pandering to the masses created a "morbid derangement" of government, a potentially fatal 
"malady" unless people realized that society remains free only so long as its leaders have 
sufficient latitude to exercise their judgment.  
 In the same line, V. O. Key, Jr. (1964) says that democracies decay, if they do, not 
because of the cupidity of the masses, but because of the stupidity and self-seeking of leadership 
echelons. He argues that “politicians often make of the public a scapegoat for their own 
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shortcomings; their actions, they say, are a necessity for survival given the state of public 
opinion.”  Here, two schools of thoughts confront: skeptics and optimists.  The skeptics sustain 
that human weaknesses make mass participation in politics both impractical and undesirable and 
judge ordinary people as simply lacking the requisite knowledge, skills, and motivations to act 
responsibly (Schumpeter, 1975: 60-61). These doubters accuse them (ordinary people) of placing 
“immediate gratification of wants ahead of the long-run interests of the commonwealth”.  
On the one hand, admitting that the populace is the ultimate source of political authority, 
doubters believe that the affairs of state are best left to trained, experienced, and dispassionate 
public servants. According to Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba (1963), “periodic elections, 
interest groups, the media, and town meetings suffice to keep leaders in line and air grievances.” 
They argue that a large dose of apathy is healthy for the country, in fact, since the masses can be 
overly demanding and tempestuous and, unless reined in, are likely to trample political 
institutions.  
On the other hand, the optimists recognize the public's many shortcomings but still insist 
that most of the citizens have more intelligence and decency than critics realize (William 
Caspary, 173).  
Furthermore, the common people's flaws result not from inborn weaknesses but from 
defective social and political institutions that limit information and discourage 
participation. The body politic can govern itself responsibly if given the chance, and 
therefore "average" men and women should become more, not less, involved in public 
affairs. 
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I.2.2.	  Communication	  theories	  and	  press	  freedom	  
 
Several times, when there is a conflict, there is a great contribution attributed to media 
inasmuch as they most of the time lapse during sensitive periods. However, people tend to forget 
media are managed by people, not necessarily journalists but those with power in power. Thus, 
before putting heavy blames on media and journalists a number of issues should be addressed. 
Who owns media? Who are their different publics? How are they (publics)? Do they have the 
capacity to digest media messages? How could that affect media operations?  
 
I.2.3.	  Media	  Effect	  Theories	  
 
The Societal and Media Theories draw attention to the societal level (hegemony and 
public sphere theory) and accumulative individual level effects over longer periods of time, such 
as differential media exposure and cultivation theory. According to W. Russell Neuman & 
Lauren Guggenheim (2011), the hegemony, public sphere, and to some extent, cultivation 
traditions are associated with progressive political views and a critical perspective. Scholars have 
examined how exposure may influence salience of, interpretation of, and cognitive organization 
of information and opinions to which individuals are exposed (Neuman & Guggenheim 
2011:178). To judge the use or uselessness of information we should think in terms of Lasswell’s 
‘‘Who Says What to Whom with What Effect’’ and institutional/cultural level models of the 
function of communication for society W. (Neuman & Guggenheim 2011:177). 
 
As media influence people, people can also influence media. That phenomenon through 
which media and society affect each other is called “Media Effect Theories.” Communication 
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theorists define it as how media affect the society and how society affects media. Among those 
theories, we will look at the Magic Bullet Theory also called Hypodermic Needle Theory, Free-
step Flow of Information, Uses and Gratification Theory and Media’s Social Responsibility 
Theory. 
I.2.3.1.	  Hypodermic	  Needle	  Theory	  
The hypodermic needle theory (also known as the hypodermic-­‐syringe model) is a theory 
of communication also referred to as the "magic bullet" perspective, or the transmission-­‐belt 
model. The free Encyclopedia says that, essentially, this theory holds that an intended message is 
directly received and wholly accepted by the receiver. It is rooted in 1930s behaviorism created 
by the Frankfurt School in Germany and is considered by many to be obsolete today.  
 
 
The theory applied on Rwanda Genocide against Tutsi. In 1990s and before, ordinary 
people in Rwanda used to believe, on the one hand, that media are the administration tools and 
only leaders can have their voices heard through media channels. On the other hand, they were 
considering media messages as an absolute truth; which played a big role in spreading 
propaganda messages discriminating against Tutsis. The hypodermic needle theory is, ipso facto,  
not about audiences being obsessed to mass media but suggests they are helpless and passive 
victims to the evading media messages - injected into their thought field thus affecting them 
beyond their will. 
Nonetheless, the success of this theory may depend on the culture, level of education and 
the government regime at hand. The example of the “Panic Broadcast"  also known as “War of 
the Worlds” through which  the radio programming was interrupted with a "news bulletin" for 
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the first time that Martians had begun an invasion of Earth in a place called Grover's Mill, New 
Jersey challenges it. According to Katz & Lazarsfeld (1955), approximately 12 million people in 
the United States heard the broadcast and about one million of those actually believed that a 
serious alien invasion was underway.  
A wave of mass hysteria disrupted households, interrupted religious services, caused 
traffic jams and clogged communication systems. People fled their city homes to seek 
shelter in more rural areas, raided grocery stores and began to ration food. The nation was 
in a state of chaos, and this broadcast was the cause of it (Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955). 
According to media theorists, this is exactly how the Magic Bullet Theory works; by injecting 
the message directly into the "bloodstream" of the public, attempting to create a uniform 
thinking. According to them, the effects of the broadcast suggest that the media could manipulate 
a passive and gullible public. 
 
I.2.3.2.	  Uses	  and	  gratification	  theory	  
Media do not operate in an empty vacuum. Their different publics have their cultures, 
their prerequisite knowledge and their way of understanding and doing their things and this 
enables them to choose from what is right and what is wrong, good and bad, constructive and 
destructive.  In fact, some theorists, researchers and scholars do recognize the audiences’ ability 
for selecting which media to follow and more specifically which program depending on the gap 
they wish to fill (Katz and Blumler, 1974; Lorna Good, 2013). In addition, with people being 
enlightened by education and the bridging of the world by the emerging new technologies, 
people have become more and more aware of media propaganda and tend to filter the messages 
they are pumped in by media.  
37	  
	  
 
Katz & Blumler (1974) identified this audiences’ capacity to choose into various media 
messages the ones that serve their interests as “Uses and Gratification Theory”. The latter is an 
approach to understanding why people actively seek out specific media outlets and contents for 
gratification purposes (Lorna Good, 2013:3). According to Good, this theory raises a debate 
regarding to how users proactively search for media that will not only meet a given need but 
enhance knowledge, social interactions and diversion. 
 
Some scholars view the theory of users and gratification as an extension of Abraham Maslwow’s 
Need and Motivation Theory (Greg’s Media, 2013&Good, 2013). 
Pyramid of Maslow’s Needs and Motivations 
 
 
Uses and gratification theory seems the opposite of the magic bullet theory. It assumes 
that members of the audience are not passive but take an active role in interpreting and 
integrating media into their everyday lives. The theory also considers the audiences as 
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responsible for choosing media to meet their needs and suggests that people use the media to 
fulfill specific gratifications (Lorna Good, 2013:4). Good argues that this theory would then 
imply that the media compete against other information sources for viewers’ gratification. 
Blumler and Katz (1974) argue that it is not what media do to people, but what people do with 
media. 
As above described, the theory tend to clear media professionals and practitioners from 
forcing the public into insane activities through their naughty messages. Following the magic 
bullet theory, it might be unreasonable to attribute the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi on media. I 
do agree that there might have been other main factors that contributed to mass killings in 
Rwanda Genocide against Tutsi rather than media.   
Nonetheless, considering the nature of the audience, the media regime and the political 
regime in place would help us understanding the issue in question. What kind of the media 
publics was there in Rwanda during and prior the Genocide? What was the literacy rate to allow 
different Rwanda publics to responsibly and cleverly analyze and understand what was going 
on? On the other hand, what kinds of media were there? What were their editorial lines? What 
was their journalists’ level of education in comparison with the ordinary citizens’? How was 
their collaboration with politicians? Did they respond to their social responsibility? Responding 
to all these kinds of question would help us understanding the ample of the role of media in the 
1994 Genocide against Tutsi. 
	  	  I.2.3.3.	  Free	  flow	  of	  information	  theory	  
  
Originally, the idea of the “freedom of press” referred only to international relations. The 
idea postulated from the end of WWII as the “free flow of information”, i.e freedom of 
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information flow on an international scale was an old formula, revamped for the international 
market.  Of course, some practices and conceptions were developed earlier in the thirties when 
the first broadcasts for foreign listeners were started in Europe. It is symptomatic that Nazi 
Germany excelled in this activity and that is why thirty seven states, including USSR, prepared 
the international convention concerning the use of broadcasting in the cause of peace, signed on 
23rd September 1936 in Geneva. This convention merits attention: it expresses a justified anxiety 
of the use of broadcasting to interfere in other nations’ internal affairs, to propagate hatred and 
racism and to promote social unrest and revolts. The Article III of the convention points out that 
all parties undertook to ban or stop broadcasting programs damaging to the favorable 
international climate of understanding. 
 
Jay Rosen (2000) advocates for citizen journalism, which in my view gives a way 
through to the free flow of information. According to Rosen, transparency means we can see in 
to government, we can find out what it is doing and we can look at what is happening in our 
name. Having a say on what is being done on your behalf could invoke a sense of responsibility 
and accountability.  
And accountability means once we look in, we can throw the bums out, we can get 
different people in there if the ones who are there now aren't doing their job. So when 
transparency is interfered with, when opacity takes over, when we can't see in, when we 
can't find out what's going on, when therefore we can't hold people accountable, it's not 
only frustrating, but it wears away at the very heart of self-government and what happens 
is that slowly, and this can take many years, but very bit by bit, the legitimacy of 
government self wears away and I think this is a huge problem in our time. People are not 
accountable; people in power are not accountable. 
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  I.2.3.4.	  Media’s	  Social	  Responsibility	  theory	  
 
The Social Responsibility Theory takes its roots in two concepts of journalism, 
“developmental journalism” and “public journalism”. Guraratne (1978) described developmental 
journalism as an integral part of a new journalism that involved “analytical interpretation, subtle 
investigation, constructive criticism and sincere association with the grass-roots (rather than the 
elite).”  He argued that developmental journalism was not compatible with either the libertarian 
concept, which defined the function of the mass media as providing information and 
entertainment, or the authoritarian concept, which stifled “criticism of political machinery and 
the officials in power” and imposed a “top-down approach to problem solving.” 
 
According to Johan Galtung &Vicente Martínez Guzmán (1992), the task of the 
journalist is to unreveal the threads of the development drama that takes place in the centre and 
the periphery, pick them out of the intricate web of relationships, “hold them up in the sunlight, 
and demonstrate the connection to readers, listeners and viewers” as IPS attempts to do at 
present. What is important to note, here, is this relationship between media and its different 
publics; readers, listeners and viewers. Apart from development, responsible media would 
enlighten the public about all caprices that would incite people into unnecessary conflicts and 
hinder human development. 
I.2.3.5.	  Authoritarianism	  theory	  
According to this theory, mass media, though not under the direct control of the State, 
had to follow its bidding. Under an Authoritarian approach in Western Europe, freedom of 
thought was jealously guarded by a few people (ruling classes), who were concerned with the 
emergence of a new middle class and were worried about the effects of printed matter on their 
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thought process. Steps were taken to control the freedom of expression. The result was advocacy 
of complete dictatorship. The theory promoted zealous obedience to a hierarchical superior and 
reliance on threat and punishment to those who did not follow the censorship rules or did not 
respect authority. Censorship of the press was justified on the ground that the State always took 
precedence over the individual's right to freedom of expression. 
According to Rahim Raza (2012), the world has been witness to authoritarian means of 
control over media by both dictatorial and democratic governments. He argues that today many 
nations, though, deny practicing authoritarian principles used for expression but behind the 
curtain, authoritarian practice is carried out. Raza cautions that these practices are used in various 
forms and techniques. In some countries, particularly in the developing ones, these are used in 
visible form like “Official Secret Act”, “National Security Act”, etc. and in some instances, 
control over the press is carried out in form of financial threat (Raza 2012,1). 
 
I.2.3.6.	  Libertarianism	  theory	  
This theory is based on the right of an individual, and advocates absence of restraint. 
Boaz David (1997) defines it as a political philosophy that advocates free will, individual rights, 
and voluntary cooperation. According to Stephan Kinsella (2011), it is rooted in ancient ideas of 
natural justice, fairness, peace, and cooperation. You could even say that any civilized society is 
already somewhat libertarian. She argues that after all, civilization requires peace and 
cooperation, which imply respect for others' rights, and this is what the libertarian seeks. 
 Some scholars and human rights activists have always viewed the State as a threat to 
libertarianism. Whitz (2011) points out, for instance, that the State was thought of as a major 
source of interference on the rights of an individual and his property. Kinsella, however, calls it a 
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deviation of the theory. She says there are deviations from ideal libertarianism, in the form of 
both private crime and public crime — that is, state regulations and laws that derogate from 
private-property rights. But the prosperity of the modern age is the result of human cooperation 
and free markets, and it exists despite deviations from libertarian principles (Kensilla, 2011:1). 
According to her, most people would not steal their neighbor's property even if they could get 
away with it. They respect their neighbors' libertarian rights already — to a certain degree. 
 
Advocates of this theory were Lao Tzu, an early 16th century philosopher, John Locke of 
Great Britain in the17th century, John Milton, the epic poet ("Aeropagitica") and John Stuart 
Mill, an essayist ("On Liberty"). Milton in Aeropagitica in 1644, referred to a self righting 
process if free expression is permitted "let truth and falsehood grapple." In 1789, the French, in 
their Declaration of The Rights of Man, wrote "Every citizen may speak, write and publish 
freely." 
Out of such doctrines came the idea of a "free marketplace of ideas." George Orwell 
defined libertarianism as "allowing people to say things you do not want to hear". Libertarians 
argued that the press should be seen as the Fourth Estate reflecting public opinion. Press 
ownership under libertarian system is likely to be private and should be free from defamation, 
obscenity, impropriety and sedition (Whiz, 2011). Countries practicing the libertarian philosophy 
are the United States, Great Britain and some other Western European nations. 
I.3. Communicative actors and citizenship 
Circumstances of recent conflicts have provoked new interest in the issues of political 
actors, and there seem to be a strong disengagement from conventional politics by citizens across 
the democratic world. This part tries to analyze how new forms of political communication 
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might influence the relationship between citizens and other political actors, and how the 
regulation of speech influences politics.  It also looks at how interest groups affect the 
democratic process, and whether institutional 'engineering' has any significant impact upon 
politics. 
Media Center Sarajevo (2010) believes that citizen participation in the political life of 
local communities and in the decisions taken by local public administrations is an important 
aspect of democracy-building.  The latter argues that it is a mechanism for the effective external 
monitoring of government work, but also a means for making public policies that are close to 
actual citizen needs, (Media Center Sarajevo, 2010:9). Eloísa Nos Aldás (2013), looking at 
capacities of public discourses to configure -or not nonkilling cultures, says that communication 
actions towards nonkilling societies implies acting consistently on ideas in regard with what 
society considers “reality”, politics, ethics through the interaction among all social actors in 
present-day scenarios, from civil society, individuals to top politicians or groups of power (Nos 
Aldás2, 013:96-97): 
Specifically, we head towards scenarios of collective reflection where individuals and 
groups recognize each other and negotiate their interests in the public sphere from 
collective concerns. Due to the imbalance of power and the reign of private interests, 
many times we are talking about the need for lobbying or advocacy actions, including 
nowadays the engine of social networks such as Facebook, Twitter or different blogs and 
other web 2.0. platforms. 
Contrary to the trends of “hatred communication”, war propaganda or hegemonic 
discourses, Nos Aldás suggests the following characteristics for communication for nonkilling 
cultures:  
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§ Utter discourses from subject to subject. Configure communication through the 
interaction among interlocutors, recognized as equals, and responsibility-based discourses 
which always talk about people as subjects and take care not to represent them as objects, 
thereby avoiding the dangers of dehumanization or disrespect (cultural violence). 
§ Discourses that make the effort of presenting the complete picture of the situations or 
experiences; discourses that face the complexity of human relations, with their mistakes 
and assets, without bipolarity or dichotomies of good and evil but including the multiple 
sides and perspectives of every conflict from the different actors (accepting and dealing 
with vulnerability but also recognizing responsibilities). 
§ Ethically-committed discourses, not neutral ones. Discourses that explicitly state the 
interests behind them. At the same time that they present alternatives, they point out who 
is responsible for what as well as the real causes of injustice, and claim for justice. 
§ They are performative. They share a participant approach. These are not objective 
(detached) discourses. They search for intersubjectivity. They take part in the action. 
They search for effective discourses, for changes, for results. This also leads to present a 
representative individualization of experiences (the narrator being part of the realities 
talked about) so to help to understand their complexity and idiosyncrasy and to foster 
awareness and remembrance. 
§ All of these characteristics imply a dialogic rhetoric in order to structure interactive and 
horizontal discourses. This way of understanding communication leads us to introduce 
here the idea of a cultural, educational and transformative efficacy (and efficiency) as 
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the only way to really have a cultural impact and instigate the processes of social change.  
It is in this context she argues that there is need to combine the traditional concepts of 
communication and advertising efficacy, usually based on quantitative criteria of impact and 
behavioral short-term change, with a more qualitative analysis based on the forms of 
communicating relating to each other. To her, it is essential to pay critical attention to the “styles 
of communication” we use and how they influence our beliefs, values, attitudes and long-term 
behavior analysis (Nos Aldás, 2013:98). 
In rearward of the impact of media in enforcing nonkilling cultures, particularly through 
democratic principles, Media Center Sarajevo (2010) cautions that local media are the primary 
source of information on the work of local governments, as well as on the political, cultural and other 
relevant events within the local community. In this sense, any misinterpreted issue in media or 
simply misinformation can harm the society while clear and objective information is more likely to 
positively save it (society) even when it is a controversy since it opens it to public debates.  
I completely agree with Media Center Sarajevo that when media perform their function 
well, they constitute an important mechanism through which citizens can participate in the public 
life of their community, articulating their interests and deliberating on government performance. 
However, to ensure their informative function, quality, substantial and diverse media reporting 
on locally relevant topics is necessary, as well as a media sphere that is open towards different, 
often opposed, actors (Media Center Sarajevo, 2010:35).   
According to McQuail (1993),	  the media have five tasks: informing; interpreting facts and 
events, mobilizing, expressing or fostering common values and cultures, as well as entertaining. 
Similarly, Gurevitch and Blumler (1994) suggest that the media should: 
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§ inform about important developments in various domains likely to impact citizens’ lives; 
§ provide analysis identifying the forces at work behind important problems and potential 
solutions; 
§  act as watchdogs against abuse of power, thus enhancing the accountability of office 
holders; 
§ present different views and debates between them; 
§ contribute to citizen interest and learning about public issues and processes. 
McQail further argues that citizens need relevant information and analyses to identify, 
articulate, and voice their preferences about the key issues affecting them, which suggests that 
the media may register palpable effects on: 
1) citizens’ knowledge about public affairs; 
2) citizens’ participation in local public affairs; 
3) a sense of sharing common concerns for which common solutions are 
required; 
4) local governance. 
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CHAPTER	  II:	  INTERNATIONAL	  RELATIONS	  THEORIES	  AND	  PRESS	  
FREEDOM	  AND	  SPEECH	  FREEDOM	  
II.0. Introduction  
This part goes through very important theories of international relations that relate in one 
way or another with media freedom and speech freedom. It analyzes theories that invoke citizen 
participation in policy designing and decision making. Theories such as democracy theory, 
political space, Freedom of speech, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, etc are 
tackled on and their interaction with each other is viewed so that we get a common 
understanding on the importance of freedom of speech in peoples’ everyday lives. 
II.1.	  Democracy	  theory	  
 
Bearing in mind that public opinion lies at the heart of democratic theory, it is worth 
understanding more democracy and its bonds with free speech and press freedom. Dahl (1998), 
for example, points out that elected officials, elections that are ‘‘free, fair, and frequent,’’ 
freedom of expression, accessible alternative sources of information, the right to form and 
participation in independent associations, and the inclusion of all adult citizens in the preceding 
institutions as prerequisite conditions for democracy.  
Whereas Dahl puts an emphasis on the importance of a responsive government, other 
conceptualizations have focused on checks and balances on government power. For instance, the 
Freedom House index of political rights looks at anticorruption measures, political pluralism, and 
participation and minority protections in addition to the electoral process (Freedom House 
2007a; Woodring, 2009:597). 
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Freedom of expression is essential in enabling democracy to work and public 
participation in decision-making. Citizens cannot exercise their right to vote effectively or take 
part in public decision-making if they do not have free access to information and ideas and are 
not able to express their views freely. According to USAID (2013), freedom of expression is, 
thus, not only important for individual dignity but also to participation, accountability and 
democracy. Violations of freedom of expression often go hand in hand with other violations, in 
particular the right to freedom of association and assembly.  
II.1.1.	  Political	  Space	  and	  Press	  Freedom	  
 
The concept of political space goes hand in hand with media freedom and freedom of 
opinion. Media channels enable elites/leaders to address to the general public, and enabling at the 
same time the public to interact with leaders and present to them their priorities. For Synder and 
Ballentine (1996), the presence of democratic characteristics is sustained by the ability of free 
news media to affect government respect for human rights. According to them, this depends on 
the nature of the media, in particular on the presence of the journalistic norm of objectivity. 
Synder and Ballentine argue that “if the media are politically independent and objective, 
so that they can provide a forum for public debate, they should have the credibility to serve as a 
check on government behavior and therefore be linked to improved government respect for 
physical integrity rights.” They worry that, though partisan media can also provide a forum for 
political debate, when controlled by competing political elites they may serve to provoke the 
government and thereby decrease government respect for human rights in general. In Woodring 
convictions, in a democracy where news media are free from government censorship and able to 
act as a watchdog over the government and where there are executive constraints, political 
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competition and participation, there is higher government respect for physical integrity rights 
because of an interaction between the free media which are likely to cover violations of human 
rights and the presence of vibrant institutions with which to hold the government accountable. 
(Witten-Woodring, 2009: 603). 
II.1.2.	  Freedom	  of	  Media	  and	  Democracy	  
 
Some scholars argue that freedom of speech is more important to a democracy than the 
right to vote.  Mueller (1992) says that ‘‘if citizens have the right to complain, to petition, to 
organize, to protest, to demonstrate, to strike, to threaten to emigrate, to shout, to publish,’’ the 
government will be more responsible and more responsive.  However, the effect of free space is 
still neglected in autocratic states. I completely agree with Woodring that because free media 
itself could be considered an essential component of democracy, we would expect to find more 
free media in democratic states while it is the opposite in authoritarian nations (woodring, 
2009:601). 
While it is still debatable to set criteria of free media, Freedom House (2007b) finds it 
important to look beyond the issues of law and ownership and consider, instead, the function and 
practices of the media. Freedom House (2007b), thus, puts forward the legal, political, and 
economic environments in which media operate and sets the following as criteria for free media: 
constitutional provisions to protect press freedom and freedom of information; enforcement of 
these provisions; an absence of laws restricting reporting; freedom of media outlets to determine 
content; free access to  official and unofficial sources; a lack of official censorship and journalist 
self censorship; freedom of media outlets from intimidation and violence; freedom from 
economic control on the part of both government and private media ownership; freedom from 
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economic manipulations through ‘‘allocation of advertising or subsidies’’ and bribery of 
journalists; and a transparency of ownership which allows ‘‘consumers to judge the impartiality 
of the news.’’  
However, critics accuse Freedom House of not considering the professional norms which 
shape the agency that drives journalistic practices. Normally, professional news media should 
abide by professional values of objectivity, fairness, independence, and a sense of responsibility 
to provide the audience with complete, accurate and balanced news. Nevertheless, in many parts 
of the world, independent media remain closely connected to competing political parties and are 
transparently partisan (McQuail, Graber, and Norris 2008). Woodring argues that in, both, the 
objective model and the partisan model, covering politics and serving as a watchdog over 
government behavior are critical aspects of journalism.  
A free media in Woodring´s perception should: 
1. Operate in a legal environment that: 
a) provides and enforces constitutional protection of media freedom 
b) is free from laws which restrict reporting 
2. Operate in a political environment that: 
a) is free from government censorship 
b) allows open access to multiple competing sources 
c)  is free from intimidation and physical violence against journalists 
3. Operate in an economic environment that 
a) is free from financial manipulation by government or other actors (including 
restrictions on production and/or distribution and reliance on advertising and⁄or 
subsidies) 
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b) encourages a plurality of ownership that facilitates competition among media 
outlets 
c) facilitates the dissemination of information to citizens 
4. Operate in a professional environment that 
a) encourages journalists to serve as watchdogs, monitoring and reporting on 
government 
b) encourages the coverage of contentious stories 
c) encourages news media to serve as a voice for the marginalized 
d) discourages self-censorship 
Watchdog	  schema	  as	  proposed	  by	  Witten-­‐Woodring	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II.1.3.	  Freedom	  of	  Associations	  and	  Freedom	  of	  Peaceful	  Assembly	  in	  Rwanda	  
Freedom of Association refers to the right to form groups, to organize and to assemble 
together with the aim of addressing issues of common concern and this is one of the human 
rights. According to Human Rights Education Associates (2003), the ability to organize is an 
important means by which citizens can influence their governments and leaders. Maina Kiai 
(2014) puts it that the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association are essential 
components of democracy, and States are called upon by the Council to respect and fully protect 
the rights of all individuals to assemble peacefully and associate freely. The right to freedom of 
association and assembly is protected in international and regional human rights treaties and 
more specifically, it is stipulated in the Article 20 of the Universal declaration of Human Rights. 
In Rwanda, the constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly, and the 
government generally respects this right, although there are exceptions. Freedom of assembly is 
subject to restrictions inasmuch as to protect the society from hate speeches. For example, 
authorities may legally require advance notice for public meetings and demonstrations but must 
respond to such requests within one week or 15 days, depending on the type of event (Maina 
Kiai, 2014).   
The UN Report of Expert (2014) points out that in the period preceding the September 
Chamber of Deputies’ elections, opposition parties reported that local officials at times denied 
permission for political rallies or instructed citizens not to attend the rallies. According to the 
report, while the constitution provides for freedom of association, the government limited the 
right. While the government generally granted licenses, it impeded the formation of new political 
parties and restricted political party activities (Maina Kiai, 2014). He accused the government of 
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introducing imposed and burdensome NGO registration and renewal requirements, especially on 
international NGOs, as well as time-consuming requirements to submit annual financial and 
activity reports. 
  
II.1.4.	  Liberalism	  theory	  
Bertrand Badie, et al (2011) view liberalism as a family portrait of principles and 
institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics such as individual freedom, political 
participation, private property, and equality of opportunity-that all liberal democratic societies, 
by definition, share to some degree. Badie says that political theorists identify liberalism with an 
essential principle: the importance of the freedom of the individual. Above all, this  is  “a belief 
in the importance  of  moral freedom,  of  the right to  be  treated and a duty to treat others  as  
ethical subjects and not  as  objects or means only.” 
He insists that the ideal version of liberalism is marked by a shared commitment to four 
essential institutions. First, citizens possess juridical equality and other fundamental civic rights 
such as freedom of religion and the press. Second, the effective sovereigns of the state are 
representative legislatures deriving their authority from the consent of the electorate and 
exercising their representative authority free.  
Liberal democracies widely opens doors to all criticism and authorities take responsibility 
to filter and decide on what serves better the public interests. In contrast with autocratic regimes, 
liberal democracy finds opportunity in each and every citizen’s point of view in building a fair 
society where everyone enjoys his rights, including the right to freedom of speech. Without 
ignoring that there should be some doze in ones expression for a mutual respect within the 
society, I believe that silencing people reduces the chances for a nation to maturely grow and 
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develop. It hinders people from critical thinking and resourceful ideas that would lead to a more 
sustained progress. 
II.1.5.	  Social	  Justice	  Theory	  	  
 
Political theorists view social justice and democracy as close concepts, though the two 
concepts may present some differences. The interrelatedness occurs in many ways such as ideas 
and institutions, citizenship, community, and the welfare state (Micheal J. Prince, 2003:2). 
According to Prince,  a series of fundamental challenges such as poverty and low incomes for 
many, irregular and precarious employment for many others, inequalities in health and education 
opportunities, disparities in safe and fulfilling life chances and experiences, no real progress on 
establishing a new relationship with First Nations, and an attack on vulnerable groups, as well as 
the middle class, through cutbacks in essential public services favor social injustice, giving, thus 
a way through to tyranny and violation of some fundamental human rights.   
Both democracy and social justice are multidimensional ideas tied to judgments about 
what constitute a good life, a free and fair society, and how to realize these. As such, they 
are contentious and contested concepts, even while they are highly valued. Both are 
ancient concepts in political philosophy and remain today hard-fought ideals. This tells us 
that they are never complete. They are time-defined principles and practices. With the 
passage of time, and with its changes in the economic, social and political context, 
experiences are gathered and expectations are altered as to what can and should be done 
in the name of justice or democracy. Both, therefore, have a history, as well as an 
institutional dimension and a cultural side (Prince, 2003:2). 
 
Prince, pointing at the impact of government cutbacks aggravating inequalities and 
hindering the exercise of basic rights and freedoms, argues that in part, the connection between 
democracy and social justice plays out in a negative way. Cuts to legal aid, court services, and to 
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a variety of community advocacy and outreach groups means a decline in the ability of people to 
readily and effectively exercise their legal rights and democratic freedoms to associate, express 
their beliefs, and promote social and political change. As stated in a BC NDP policy report, 
“Political equality doesn’t mean a lot if you can’t afford a roof over your head,” (Prince, 2003:2). 
  
 
II.2. Human Security and Speech freedom 
II.2.1.	  Sovereignty	  and	  Freedom	  of	  Speech	  and	  press	  freedom	  
 
According to William Manguson (2010), State sovereignty has long held a revered post 
in international law, but it received a blow in the aftermath of World War II, when the world 
realized the full extent of atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis on their own citizens. Magnuson 
says that, in the postwar period, the idea that individuals possessed rights independent of their 
own states gained a foothold in world discussions, and a proliferation of human rights treaties 
guaranteeing fundamental rights followed. These rights were, for the most part, unenforceable, 
though, and in the 1990s, a number of humanitarian catastrophes (in Kosovo, Rwanda, and 
Somalia) galvanized the international community to develop a doctrine to protect the 
fundamental rights of all individuals (Magnuson, 2010:1).  
It is from the above incidences where results the “responsibility to protect” individuals 
from genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity stood as a radical rejection of the 
prewar concept of state sovereignty and assured that states could no longer hide behind the shield 
of territorial integrity (Tom Campbel et al, 1986:99). However, Magnuson (2010) argues that the 
doctrine created another disconnect in international law: it picked out only a few fundamental 
rights for protection, leaving citizens to rely on the whim of their states to protect their other 
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rights. Magnus points out therefore that this state of the law is no longer sustainable, as it is still 
beholden in important ways to the now-eroded concept of state sovereignty.  
Scholars, researchers and human rights activists claim that the responsibility to protect 
should be expanded to include protection of fundamental rights in general and the freedom of 
speech in particular. The inclusion of the freedom of expression in the pantheon of protected 
rights is broadly consistent with the moral, legal, and consequentialist arguments in favor of the 
international norm of responsibility to protect. Moreover, an expansive reading of the obligation 
to intervene, particularly in nontraditional ways, will increase the legitimacy of the international 
system.  
Magnuson (2010), considers grossly disproportionate the prevention of such violations of 
international law: troops marching into a country to restore free speech could, according to him, 
in certain circumstances, appear quite incongruous (Magnuson, 2010: 307-308). Magnuson 
outlines at least three primary reasons why such a view of the responsibility to protect is 
enforceable.  First, the idea that widespread violations of the freedom of speech are outlawed 
under international law is not radical at all but rather a fundamental precept of customary law. 
According to the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, “A state violates 
international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones . . . (g) a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”  
The prevalence of the internet today opens new pathways for communicating with wide 
audiences. According to Jamie Frederic Metzl (1997), radio and television broadcasts are still 
effective tools of message diffusion, as seen to terrible consequences in Rwanda. At least one 
commentator has argued that international law should sanction the jamming of radio frequencies 
to prevent dissemination of incitements to genocide (Metzl, 1997:250-51). I agree with Samantha 
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Power (2003) that countries could transmit “counterbroadcasts” to communicate messages that 
have been suppressed.  However, this raises a larger point about the definition of the freedom of 
expression. “As the importance of free speech increases in the modern world, the simple 
language of human rights treaties on what free speech includes will no longer suffice” (Power 
2003:317) . She insists that international community must engage in a broader discussion about 
how to conceive the freedom of expression in international law.  
Stephanie Farrior (1996) argues that a lot of discussions have been made over the status 
of hate speech in international law, but if the freedom of expression is to be taken seriously as a 
norm of international law, its contours must be sketched out more fully. She wonders if the 
international community has an affirmative obligation to provide methods of communication to 
foreign citizens. If hate speech must be a motive to restrict the speech of some in order to 
empower the speech of others also raises another question. What should be done to strengthen 
the freedom of expression? All these concerns must be addressed if the international community 
is to strictly fulfill the promise of human rights for all.  
Farrior (1996) finds, however, challenging to expand the concept of the responsibility to 
protect to include the right to free speech as it entails some difficult questions. One of these 
questions, she mentions, is whether it is politically feasible or desirable. She concludes that 
closing down newspapers and preventing public speeches are crimes that pale in comparison to 
the crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (Farrior, 1996:378-84).  
II.2.2.	  National	  Security	  and	  Freedom	  of	  Speech	  and	  Press	  freedom	  	  
 
The emergence of frequent power dynamics puts the issue of security at stake in power 
relations. However, one of the characteristics of the 21st century is the “oppression fatigue”.  
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More aware of human rights they are entitled to, the ordinary peoples want their voices heard 
and the elite wants to control all their subjects´ movements. Consequently, national security and 
the right to information become two colliding concepts. Nonetheless, while the right to share 
information is undoubtedly a fundamental human right, whether the population should have 
access to all types of information remains a debatable issue.  
Some of the elites conceal some types of information for the sake of, as they say, 
protecting the national security. But whose national security is that?  Is it a security of an empty 
vacuum or a security of people in that same place? What kind of information should be 
concealed?  Why should people, then, be prevented from knowing information that may affect 
their lives? In whose interest is that information concealed? 
Access to Information Law in Rwanda (2013) stipulates that all public institutions as well 
as private entities which are bound by this law will have a maximum of two days to provide 
information that is being sought by a journalist and three days in case of an ordinary citizen 
(from the date of submission of request).  However, where the request for information is not, 
according to the law, about the life or liberty of a person, information officers can seek extension 
of the period to 14 days through their own request to the Office of the Ombudsman. 
           The government, however, determines the circumstances in which the information could 
be kept secret, cautioning concerned personnel not to disclose the information that could 
destabilize national security to journalists and citizens.  
 
Information officers will thus have the right and obligation to protect from the public 
such information as plans and details of military arsenal and intelligence operations, state 
secrets related to administrative or criminal investigations, classified tenders and 
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confidentialities in government relations with other countries, among other 
sensitive details (Eugene Kwibuka, 2013). 
While the Access to Information Law was thought to facilitate journalists to get 
information that most of the leaders are reluctant to reveal, the ministerial orders also give 
leaders of private organizations bound by this law the right to withhold or release certain informa
tion sought by the general public and journalists. 
           The Access to Information Law obliges all private firms which deal with matters of 
general public interest, human rights and freedom of people in the country to release unrestricted 
information to the general public and journalists in particular. It, however, grants companies 
providing services such as telecommunication, transport, healthcare and medicine, education, 
security, social security, production and commercialization of food and drinks and financial 
firms the right to restrict the information as the above mentioned categories are meant to be part 
of national security concerns. 
            The law obliges political and religious organizations as well as local and international 
Non-Governmental Organizations to release unrestricted information to the public. While some 
analysts view the right of citizens to seek information on governance and other issues of concern 
to them as meant to create a policy responsive society and promote transparency and protect civil
 rights (Kwibuka, 2013), journalists accuse the ministerial orders, that followed the promulgation 
of the Access to Information Law, of being tools to restrict information and press freedom  
(Ireme, 2013:1).  
The ministerial orders, in question, envisage the punishment from 20-25 year of 
imprisonment in war time and 10-15 years of jail in peaceful times to any person who gets to 
concealed information. In an interview with Ireme, some Rwandan journalists see these 
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ministerial orders as a barrier to investigative journalism. War and peace related theories such as 
peace journalism and war journalism will give us a clue to why such restrictions and how to 
minimize restrictions of free speech and report sensitive issues in a peaceful manner. 
II.3. Speech Freedom and the Genocide Ideology Law in 
Rwanda 
“Genocide ideology” became a crime in Rwanda in 2003 with the ratification of the new 
Rwandan Constitution as observed in its Article 13. In this article, it is mentioned that the crime 
of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes do not have a period of limitation and that 
revisionism, negationism and trivialization of genocide are punishable by the law. Article 2 of 
chapter I of Rwanda Genocide Ideology Law defines the genocide ideology as an aggregate of 
thoughts characterized by conduct, speeches, documents and other acts aiming at exterminating 
or inciting others to exterminate people basing on ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, color, 
physical appearance, sex, language, religion or political opinion, committed in normal periods or 
during war.  
The same law states that any person convicted of the crime of genocide ideology, as 
mentioned in its Articles 2 and 3,  shall be sentenced to an imprisonment of ten years to twenty 
five years and a fine of two hundred thousand (200.000) to one million (1.000.000) Rwandan 
francs. In case of recidivism, the penalty provided for in the preceding paragraph shall be 
doubled. Individual and human rights organization have been very critical to this law accusing it 
of preventing people from their freedom of speech. Critics also accuse it of being a tool to 
silence political oppositions. 
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According to Kayumba Nyamwasa and his co-authors of Rwanda Briefing, the 
government has, since 2003, used accusations of “sectarianism,” “divisionism,” and “spreading 
of genocide ideology” to curtail political opposition and civil society work, most specifically 
human rights work.  The authors of Rwanda Briefing state that the government has exploited the 
ambiguity of the anti-sectarian legislation to limit freedom of expression and to persecute 
individual opponents.   
The case of Victoire Ingabire, a politician from the opposition, was instructive. When she 
returned to Rwanda that year, having lived 16 years in exile, to prepare a run for 
president, her first stop was at the official genocide memorial. “We are here honoring at 
this memorial the Tutsi victims of the genocide. There are also Hutu who were victims of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, not remembered or honored here,” she said in a 
prepared statement. “Hutu are also suffering. They are wondering when their time will 
come to remember their people. In order for us to get to that desirable reconciliation, we 
must be fair and compassionate towards every Rwandan’s suffering, (Haward 2013). 
In the week of the national commemoration of the Genocide against Tutsi starting from 
April 7th-to 13 March 2013, in Rwanda, 42 people were said to have been arrested for “harboring 
the genocide ideology” and “uttering inflammatory speeches that negate the genocide.” The 
Rwandan police, however, insisted it had gathered sufficient evidence for 33 of the arrests for 
prosecution, while the remaining 11 were being further investigated for “suspicion of 
inflammatory speech» based on the genocide ideology law of the post-genocide period in 
Rwanda (Jane Nishimwe, 2014:1). 
Rwanda has been criticized for violating its international human rights obligations and 
commitments to freedom of expression through this law, notably through its lack of a clear 
definition on what behavior is punishable and what is not, and the broadness of the terminology 
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used for different conduct in the article.  Furthermore, Amnesty International, in its 2010 report 
Safer to stay silent: The chilling effect of Rwanda’s laws on “genocide ideology” and 
“sectarianism”, found that “many Rwandans, even those with specialized knowledge of 
Rwandan law including lawyers and human rights workers, were unable to precisely define 
genocide ideology” and, remarkably, “even judges, the professionals charged with applying the 
law, noted that the law was broad and abstract”.  
II.4. Peace Journalism and war journalism 
II.4.1.	  Peace	  Journalism	  
Peace journalism follows a long history of news publication, originating in non-sectarian 
Christian peace movements and societies of the early 19th century, which published periodicals 
(Roberts, Nancy L: 2008). Sectarian organizations also created publications focused on peace as 
part of their proselytizing in the 19th century, as did utopian communities of the period. From the 
20th century, a prominent example of sectarian journalism focused on peace was Dorothy Day's 
Catholic Worker (Roberts, Nancy L: 1991). However, Johan Galtung, Peace Professor and 
founder of peace studies, first began using the term ‘Peace Journalism’ in the 1970s. 
Peace Journalism is defined as “when editors and reporters make choices - of what to 
report, and how to report it - that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value 
non-violent responses to conflict” (Lynch and McGoldrick: 2005). According to Ross Howard 
(2009), as media play an increasingly important role in today’s society, the freedom of 
expression and freedom of the press is having a clear bearing on development, democracy and 
dialogue. The free flow of information should not encounter any obstacle with aim to inform the 
audience with complete and balanced information. 
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Howard accuses traditional journalism skills development not to include study of how 
best to cover violent conflict, and to ignore any understanding of violent conflict as a social 
process. According to him, other subjects demand that journalists have knowledge and expertise 
and experience, such as reporting on business and economics, public health, music, sports, or 
other topics. But the dynamics of violent conflict – its instigation, development and resolution – 
are not much understood by most journalists nor proficiently reported on. 
According to Johan Galtung (2003) peace journalism is in effect good journalism, 
complete journalism, journalism which is unbiased because it is written black on white. The 
report of UNESCO on freedom of speech in 2007 states that many people who call themselves 
“journaliste engagé”, in English committed journalist, think that this means they can choose 
their facts to fit their theories. It insists that a good journalist would try to give all the facts and 
must be open-minded. However, truth-oriented journalist would expose truths from all sides and 
uncover all cover-ups. The war journalist is only exposing their own truths and they help in 
covering up. “The peace journalist focuses on suffering — maybe particularly on women, the 
aged and children — give voice to the voiceless and name the evil on all sides”.  
As defined at its broadest, “Peace journalism combines journalism with an external aim. 
It understands itself as a normative mode of responsible and conscientious media coverage of 
conflict that aims at contributing to peacemaking, peacekeeping and changing the attitudes of 
media owners, advertisers, professionals and audiences towards war and peace (Hanitzch, 
Thomas: 2007). Galtung,  points Peace Journalism model as a source of practical options for 
journalists; a lead in to media monitoring for peace activists which offers a firm basis for 
drawing distinctions in content analysis by academic researchers. According to him peace 
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journalism shows backgrounds and contexts of conflicts; hears from all sides; explores hidden 
agendas; highlights peace ideas and initiatives from anywhere at any time.   
As mentioned above, Jake Lynch, a former BBC Journalist says that peace journalism is 
when editors and reporters make choices – about what to report, and how to report it – that create 
opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict. To 
him, if readers and audiences are furnished with such opportunities, but still decide they prefer 
war to peace, there is nothing more journalism can do about it, while remaining journalism. On 
the other hand, there is no matching commitment to ensuring a fair hearing for violent responses, 
if only because they seldom struggle for a place on the news agenda. Lynch reminds that a 
journalist is a ‘gatekeeper’, allowing some aspects of reality through, to emerge, blinking, into 
the public eye; and keeping the rest in the dark. He presents peace journalism, as a remedial 
strategy and an attempt to supplement the news conventions to give peace a chance. 
Peace Journalism: 
ü Explores the backgrounds and contexts of conflict formation, presenting causes and 
options on every side (not just ‘both sides’); 
ü Gives voice to the views of all rival parties, from all levels; 
ü Offers creative ideas for conflict resolution, development, peacemaking and 
peacekeeping; 
ü Exposes lies, cover-up attempts and culprits on all sides, and reveals excesses committed 
by, and suffering inflicted on, peoples of all parties; 
ü Pays attention to peace stories and post-war developments. 
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II.4.2. Criticism of Peace Journalism 
 
Despite its good intention to incite people to settle their conflicts with peaceful means, 
peace journalism does not only cover peace stories. McGoldrick and Lynch (2000) emphasized 
that peace journalism does not just mean “reporting peace”. In essence, it entails the application 
of insights from peace and conflict studies – what is known about the conflict, its dynamics and 
potential for transformation- to the everyday jobs of editing and reporting news. 
But the criticism of peace journalism is sharpest and most categorical amongst some 
journalists who call it a heretical abandonment of the integrity of journalism and its professional 
norms. David Loyn (2007) articulates that peace journalism is simply not the role of a journalist 
and is based on the flawed notion. The idea that reporters currently only look for the epicenter of 
violence or are somehow addicted to conflict is absurd, (BBC journalist David Loyn, and 
2007:33). 
According to Robert A. Hackett (2006), its proponent see it as an expression of, and/or 
improvement upon, the best practices of actually-existing journalism, as well as a means of 
ameliorating conflicts and opening up new opportunities for their peaceful resolution.  Peace 
Journalists regard conventional international news coverage -- its typical emphasis on violence, 
conflict as a two-sided win/lose struggle, government and military sources, and "our" suffering 
versus "their" villainy -- as comprising War Journalism (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005). 
Robert A. argues that Peace Journalism is an unwelcome departure from objectivity and 
towards a journalism of attachment; it mistakenly assumes powerful and linear media effects 
because it is a normative model, rooted in the discipline of peace research, that fails sufficiently 
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to take into account the constraints imposed by the actual dynamics of news production 
(including professional values and organizational imperatives), and hence, may have little to 
offer journalists in practice.   
He suggests the development of genuinely multinational and internationalist media, able 
to address and engage audiences in different countries with programming that challenges 
ethnocentric narratives and provides multiple perspectives on conflict.  To him Peace Journalism 
would be strengthened by national and global regimes of media governance that reinforced 
popular communication rights -- not only freedom of expression, but also access to the means of 
public communication.   
Dukulizimana (2014) points out that, today, media practitioners claim to just report the 
facts‒which constitutes sometimes a problem or obstacle for peace journalism. According to 
Lynch ^McGoldrick (2000), today, many people know how to create facts for journalists to 
report. Most governments think of their actions and statements as part of a ‘media strategy’, 
which cannot be separated from the business of running their country’s affairs (Dukulizimana, 
2014:53). 
Peace scholars and peace researchers view media propaganda as another important 
obstacle of Peace Journalism. In war period, media play an important role, “misinformation” 
increases especially, because involved parties know what they gain if they manipulate media and 
use them as a propaganda tools, (Dukulizimana, 2014:53). Noelle-Neumann (1995) brings in the 
theory of the “Spiral of Silence” suggesting that most frequently, the process to create the idea of 
the enemy goes together with a social pressure (Martín Galán, 2014: 261). Noelle-Neumann’s 
approach suggests that the population is conditioned by the perception they have about the 
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general thought or trends of the mass and is afraid of suffering social contempt or rejection if 
they expressed a different opinion. This may have also been the challenge for some journalists 
and reporters during the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi as almost all media were pro-
governmental, working on the side of the so called majority-Hutus, a group whose extremists 
were perpetrating genocide.  
Dukulizimana suggests that while covering stories, journalists can just report facts 
objectively using traditional principals, or simply get inspired by Peace Journalism theorists and 
report the story with the aim to contribute to peace, and sometime subjectively. However, 
scholars, academics and conflict researchers found out that some journalists do not cover 
conflicts responsibly because they lack some knowledge or do not understand the issues at stake 
(Betz, 2011: 3&Dukulizima 2014:53). 
The problem Xavier Giró (2011) identified with peace journalism is that a series of 
vectors operate in the mass media, in terms of both the decision about whether to cover conflicts, 
and how it should be covered. He argues that the international hierarchy of countries and global 
information flows is intertwined with the economic and political nature of the media and the 
culture of news journalism (Xavier Giró, 2011:3). For example, it is still fresh in peoples’ minds 
how the international media ignored to cover the Genocide against Tutsi and rushed to cover the 
presidential elections in South Africa. 
 Giró brings in another factor that the coverage of international media often depends on 
the relationship their countries of origin have with the areas in conflicts. Most of the international 
media, for example, have correspondents in their former colonies. For example, the Spanish 
media prioritize Latin America and the French media do the same for the Maghreb and sub-
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Saharan Africa (Giró, 2011:4). According to him, there are two opposing mechanisms to 
determine what news is. The first is to toe the line of the “flagship” media: CNN, the New York 
Times, etc. In so doing, there are plenty of stories about news editors who ask correspondents or 
special correspondents to produce stories based on what they have just seen or heard on CNN. 
The other approach, which is only apparently paradoxical, is to look at what the competition has 
done. If they have all done more or less the same thing, they confirm the correctness of each 
other’s approach; if one disagrees, they worry because they are off-message and thus the circle 
closes. 
 In the same line, he depicts two “battling fields” within the communicative strategy 
during conflicts: the military and the informative. The basic strategy in military conflicts is to 
misinform and mislead the counterpart (“the enemy”). This is part of the communicative 
strategies “in the frontline”. According to Teran Strand (2013), the communicative strategies are 
used to legitimize war operations while the images in the news are used to win the war on the 
home front as well as on the ground, making the spectators innocent victims to a flow of 
untruthful images and discourses. He further says it consists in gaining the public support for the 
use of military action.  
An effective tool is the construction of an image of the threatening , demonized and 
dehumanized “enemy”, discourses of  “Us against Them” “Good against Evil.” We are 
constantly being manipulated through the media. There is a constant framing of what 
information we are exposed to (Strand Teran, 2013:1). 
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II.4.3.	  War	  Journalism	  	  
Johan Galtung (2003) presented a new categorization of conventional news reporting as 
“war journalism.” Galtung argued that most regular journalism inherently or intentionally 
emphasizes and encourages violent conflict by its treatment of the issues. Galtung identified 
many troubling characteristics, including journalists’ reliance on elites and their one-sided 
explanations for conflicts and responses to conflict, a reliance on stereotypes, and an absence of 
reference to root causes and to alternative solutions to the conflict. Galtung et al. advocated the 
attitudes of media owners, advertisers, professionals and audiences towards war and peace. 
Lynch, in his article entitled “What is peace?” says that there  are deep-seated reasons for 
these opponents to be dominant conventions in journalism, but, taken together according to him, 
they mean that its framing of public debates over conflict issues is generally on the side of 
violent responses. It merits the description, ‘war journalism’.  For him, if you start thinking about 
a conflict as a tug-of-war between two great adversaries, then any change in their relationship – 
any movement – can only take place along a single axis, just as, in tug-of-war, one side gaining a 
meter means the other side losing a meter.  So, any new development in a conflict thus 
conceived, immediately begs to be assessed in a zero-sum game-anything that is not 
unequivocally, winning, risks being reported as losing. It brings a readymade incentive to step up 
efforts for victory, or escalate. People involved in conflict ‘talk tough’ – and often ‘act tough’ – 
as they play to a gallery the media have created (Jake Lynch, 2013:1). 
Probably, every conflict is fought on at least two grounds: the battlefield and the minds of 
the people via propaganda. The “good guys” and the “bad guys” can often both be guilty of 
misleading their people with distortions, exaggerations, subjectivity, inaccuracy and even 
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fabrications, in order to receive support and a sense of legitimacy (Walter Lippmann, 2005). 
Lippmann alerts that we must remember that in time of war what is said on the enemy’s side of 
the front is always propaganda, and what is said on our side of the front is truth and 
righteousness, the cause of humanity and a crusade for peace.  
Johnson (2003) emphasizes that in times of war in particular, news media face strong 
pressure to refrain from news coverage that is critical of the government. He recalls a CNN 
correspondent Christiane Amanpour saying that the media was intimidated by the Bush 
administration and consequently ‘‘self-muzzled’’ at the beginning of the Iraq war. 
However, Virgil Hawkins (2008) is doubtful about the power media, alone, may have to 
push opponents to take decisions. He argues that the media are but one of many forces that exert 
pressure on belligerents and other policymakers, and these actors have a number of options at 
their disposal when dealing with the force that is the media.  Hawkins, along with the Center for 
Global Nonkilling, brings in the resistance of belligerents with each side trying to justify their 
cause.  
While the media may serve as a source of pressure for belligerents, belligerents tend to 
aim (often successfully) for the opposite effect, with the media becoming (to a degree) a 
tool for belligerents to further their causes. Free press or not, one of the realities of 
journalistic practice is that the media rely heavily on policymakers as sources, and the 
power of entrenched nationalism give policymakers enormous influence over media 
corporations that cater to domestic audiences (Center for Global Nonkilling, 2013: 56). 
Hawkins came up with two different ways media can play a potential role in reducing 
conflict-related killings:	   stopping or limiting acts of violence, and reducing the humanitarian 
effects of conflict (Hawkins&Center for Global Nonkilling, 2013:59). According to Hawkins, 
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this could be done by encouraging policymakers to take action in response to conflict, 
encouraging increases in humanitarian aid, encouraging restraint on the part of the belligerents in 
their waging of the conflict, and by	   limiting the actions of those who facilitate conflict (those 
involved in the arms trade and the sourcing of funds). 
 
II.5. Peace Journalism in Rwanda as a country that underwent the media-supported 
tragedy of Genocide in 1994 
 
Despite the role of media in the 1994 Genocide, very little or something nearer to nothing 
has been done to promote media for peace. Some Radios initiated programs that promote the 
unity and reconciliation of Rwandans.  Peace Journalism mainly occur in theatrical dramas like 
Musekeweya, Radio Rwanda’s program and Urunana initiated by the British Broadcasting 
Corporation( BBC).   
International NGOs working in the field of peace and conflict management like Search 
For Common Ground also use radio programs like Great lakes Generation Program called in 
French Génération Grands Lacks, a youth-oriented media and outreach initiative that aims to 
address the root causes of conflict and the key issues youth are currently encountering 
throughout the Great Lakes region and Ubutaka bwacu ( a program dedicated to the use and 
redistribution of the land as a main source of income in Rwanda ) to spread balanced and 
objective information and incite people to settle their disputes with non-violence means and to 
equally share available resources. 
Hate propaganda before and during the 1994 Genocide by Radio Télévision Libre des 
Mille Colline (RTLM) and news papers like Kangura, Nyiramacibiri, Le Flambeau among others 
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gave a lessons to Rwandan journalists. The latter restrict themselves in their new coverage 
fearing to fall into the same trap as their elders. Rwandan journalists themselves elaborated a 
code of conduct as a safeguard of their career. It is noted in that code that the free flow of 
information and public enlightenment is the foundation for liberty, democracy and development.  
It also states that a journalist shall “ensure that news is balanced, impartial and fair by 
giving all sides to an issue and all efforts be made to give an opportunity to subjects of news and 
information to respond to allegations or accusations made against them”. Rwanda journalists 
would be on the right track if they managed to practice what is preached in this code. By 
examining and reporting on the two sides’ misperceptions of each other, the media encourages 
disputing sides to revise their views and move closer to reducing conflict (Ross Howard, 
2008:14).  
The 1959 and 1994 ethnic conflicts and subsequent Genocide brings the relationship 
between mass murders and mass media very closer (New Times: 2012). It is worth to remind that 
the UN mandated University for Peace based in Costa Rica took it into consideration to include 
the role of the media in Rwandan Genocide as its module among other major modules for 
Masters in Media, Conflict and Peace studies.  
When covering conflicts, media organizations are subjected to various constraints by 
governments, military, corporate pressure, economic interests, etc. Sometimes, media are more 
than willing to go along with what could be described as self-censorship (Katharine Graham: 
2000:109).  Graham argues that we live in a dirty and dangerous world and consequently there 
are some things the general public does not need to know about and should not. She believes that 
democracy flourishes when the government can take legitimate steps to keep its secrets and when 
the press can decide whether to print what it knows. 
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         There is no doubt that a good journalist who takes as his bible/coran or simply as his diary 
the principles of this career of reporting the truth, loyalty to citizens, verification of his 
information, keeping independence from his sources, keeping his news comprehensive, balanced 
and proportional and uses his consciousness (ethics) when reporting conflict stories would be 
worth of being called a peace journalist.  
II.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has thoroughly, but not exclusively, explored the key concepts of this study. 
Concepts like press freedom, speech freedom, human security and their siblings of democracy, 
human rights, security, etc have been explained to facilitate you (readers) to clearly and easily 
understand the content of this study. As this is not an isolated research, theories and research 
findings from previous researchers who navigated this area before I stepped in have also been 
considered. It was estimated that understanding the democracy theories such as political space, 
freedom of assembly, freedom of association, liberalism theories and media effects theories 
could be helpful as you undertake to read this thesis. 
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CHAPTER	  III:	  OVERVIEW	  OF	  THE	  HISTORY	  OF	  MEDIA	  IN	  RWANDA	  AND	  
THE	  RWANDA	  GENOCIDE	  AGAINST	  TUTSI	  
III.0. Introduction 
The 1994 Genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda was one of the most dreadful crimes against 
humanity since the Holocaust of World War II. According to Laura (1999), it was the first 
tragedy in which media were represented and played a clear role. She argues it was unique 
because it was heavily instigated by radio reports and sectarian reports within the country itself. 
This section will take us to a brief history of media in Rwanda. It will also assess how media 
toasted the genocide and the role of post genocide media in rebuilding the country. 
III.1. Historical context of ethnical conflicts in Rwanda 
According to Allan Thomson (2004), two competing historical evolution can be 
observed: the series of building blocks that paved the way to the point where genocide became 
conceivable; and numerous occasions when it was not yet too late to reverse this destructive 
pattern. It was under Mwami (King) Rwabugiri, a Tutsi who ruled during the late 1800s that the 
chief characteristics of modern Rwanda were fixed for the next 100 years. Thomson proceeds 
that powerful head of a centralized state, Rwabugiri provided firm direction to an elaborate series 
of subordinate structures. In the colonial era, under German and the Belgian rule, Roman 
Catholic missionaries, inspired by the overtly racist theorists of 19th century, Europe concocted a 
bizarre ideology of ethnic cleavage and racial rankings that attributed superior qualities to the 
country’s Tutsi minority. 
This 15% of the population, as it was announced, were approaching, however gradually 
the exalted level of white people in contrast with the declared brutishness and innate inferiority 
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of the ‘Bantu’ (Hutu) majority. Because missionaries ran the colonial-era schools, these 
pernicious values were systematically transmitted to several generations of Rwandans along with 
more conventional catholic teachings (Thomson, 2006:20).  The Belgians made the Mwami’s 
complex structures more rigid and ethnically inflexible.  They institutionalized the split between 
the two groups, culminating in the issuance to every Rwandan of an ethnic identity card. This 
card system was maintained for over 60 years until, with tragic irony; during the genocide it 
became the instrument that enabled Hutu killers in urban areas to identify the Tutsi who were its 
original beneficiaries (Gerald Caplan, 2006:20). 
III.1.1.	  Media	  and	  the	  1994	  Genocide	  against	  Tutsi	  in	  Rwanda	  
Researchers and scholars have argued that genocide does not start with the murder of 
masses of people; it starts in peoples’ mind. Before the weapons comes the image, before you 
can eliminate your enemy, you must define it (Mamdani 2001:9, Keen 1986:10). Media in 
Rwanda played a key role in pursuing this task, and the most critical medium for popularizing 
the genocidal message was the radio (Carruthers 2000:44, Fujii 2002:6). 
The International Media Support Report (2003) reveals that after the legalization of 
opposition political parties and the new press-law of 1991, during what was called “the Rwandan 
media’s golden age” in 1992, opposition politicians tried to withdraw Radio Rwanda from 
MRND’s control. According to the report, besides weekly chronicles obtained in 1992, 
opposition parties did not have much success in making Radio Rwanda more independent.  
The RPF’s military advance radicalized political positions, and Radio Rwanda was on the 
front-line, broadcasting false reports and MRND-communiqués using the ethnic line to 
mobilize troops and ordinary citizens against invaders. During the negotiations of the 
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Arusha Accords, reports had to show that cohabitation was impossible. Journalists who 
did not obey orders were pressed to resign. The rest of them tried to comply with it to 
keep their jobs (The International Media Support Report, 2003:10).  
The latter testifies that twice, in 1992, and in 1993, Radio Rwanda’s staff went on strike 
to demand more freedom to work, a clearer and more precise editorial line and more material 
resources. In the early 1990s, five of Radio Rwanda’s fifty journalists were Tutsi. Until the 
creation of the private radio-station RTLM in 1993, Radio Rwanda was the media with the 
biggest impact in Rwanda with its regional stations. 
  While Radio Rwanda staffs tried to claim for a freedom of speech that could allow them 
to respect journalism principals of objectivity, impartiality, accuracy and the completeness of 
information, Fujii points out that through the radio, the extremists created a cognitive and 
normative framework for mobilizing people to join in the killings. Fujii and Carruthers’s views 
do not, however, argue that Rwandans were easily swayed to kill because they believed 
everything they heard on the radio. They rather suggest that the effective use of media and other 
methods of message dissemination meant that no one could escape the image of Tutsi as the 
ultimate threat to Hutu survival (Fujii 2002:8).  
Besides radio, print media also played a significant role in fueling hatred among 
Rwandans. By the 60s, the state had two weekly publications, “Imvaho”(the truth) in 
Kinyarwanda, and “La Relève” (relief) in French. The two newspapers’ journalists were 
considered as civil servants (The International Media Support Report, 2003:11). Florian who 
worked at Imvaho revealed to the report that the two publications expressed the government’s 
official opinion. According to the same report, by the same time, Rwanda had also its own press 
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agency, “L’Agence Rwandaise de Presse” – ARP, which made a compilation of international 
telegrams then sold to the media. 
Along with the two government papers, the Catholic Church created other newspapers. 
“Kinyamateka”, a monthly newspaper in Kinyarwanda, was Rwanda’s first private media, (The 
International Media Report, 2003:13). Kinyamateka was created in 1933 and enjoyed a 
widespread distribution through the church, which was firmly established in the whole country. 
It expanded from 1955 when Grégoire Kayibenda, Rwanda’s future president, became its chief-
editor, and it then contributed to vehicle the ideas, which were to bring the 1959 social 
revolution. The International Media Support Report says the newspaper played an important role 
because it was repeatedly arguing that the Hutu majority should have political representation. In 
the 1960s, Kinyamateka was the only significant media in Rwanda, besides Radio Rwanda. 
In 1967, the church created a second publication, the bi-monthly “Dialogue”. It is said 
that both “Kinyamateka” and “Dialogue” were protected from government harassment because 
they belonged to the church. Nonetheless, after the independence, both papers had to be 
moderate in their critics of the government or its treatment of the Tutsi.  The International Media 
Report (2003) reveals that three Kinyamateka- journalists and editors who were too bold were 
jailed, had to flee, or were threatened.  
A real independent private newspaper emerged in Rwanda in 1988: “Kanguka” (wake 
up!).  This newspaper is believed to have been created and supported by a rich powerful Tutsi 
businessman, Valens Kajeguhakwa, to denounce cases of corruption scandals, which brought 
threats on its journalists and supporter, (The International Media Support Report, 2003: 13). 
However, Kanguka, as points out the report, gave new dynamic to the church’s publication, 
Kinyamateka, which became more critical again.  
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The international Media Support Report(2003) states that other publications appeared in 
early 1990, mostly in Kinyarwanda, with the success of Kanguka inspiring the president’s close 
circles to start a parody-paper - “Kangura” (wake him up!). Since then the confrontation between 
Kangura and Kanguka started with Kangura fighting against the themes debated in Kanguka.  
The report proves that the mission of the government-backed newspaper was to answer 
Kanguka’s critics following an ethnic ideology. The editor - Hassan Ngeze - who was actually 
working as a free-lancer for Kanguka in Western Rwanda later become a puppet in the hands of 
Kangura’s promoters (International Media Support Report, 2003:14).  
The report says the independent press quickly expanded with multi-party politics and the 
legalization of opposition parties in June 1991. The number of independent newspapers rose 
from a dozen to 60, most of them affiliated with or financed by the various political parties, 
following a political ideology. Some newspapers expressed extremist opinions like the militias’ 
and the new extremist party, the CDR’s (IMSR, 2003:16). Many newspapers disappeared a year 
later to the extent that by 1992, about 30 newspapers were still publishing. According to the 
report the independent press in Rwanda faced a lot of pressures.  
According to HRW (19960) the war with the RPF brought restrictions on the freedom of 
movement of journalists. The report says, private media, which were critical of the ruling party 
MRND had problems to come around and it become consequently easier for authorities to 
promote their version of events. Critical journalists could be accused to support RPF and were 
submitted to arbitrary arrest and detention (HRW, 1996:1). Newspapers were seized by 
authorities. It also says that following the RPF’s attack of October 1990, from 1990 to 1992, over 
forty journalists were arbitrarily arrested, detained or brought to trial, most of them being 
accused of being RPF-supporters.  
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In 1992, Radio Rwanda’s monopoly was kind of broken when the RPF established a 
radio-station “Radio Muhabura” broadcasting from Uganda. Most Rwandans could listen to it 
except those living in the South. If Radio Rwanda was more or less MRND controlled, Radio 
Muhabura was RPF-controlled. So the radio-station did not help much to the free flow of 
information. HRW (1996) states that  Radio Muhabura never reported abuses committed by RPF 
troops, even when there was evidence. The new radio-station had the same formal style as Radio 
Rwanda. 
According to Roméo Dallaire (1999), when news reaches the general public it shapes 
public opinion. He argues that when there is a lack of statesmanship; public opinion can force a 
government to make decision. Getting information out of the general population and holding 
decision makers accountable-by continuously berating them about what is going on and what 
they are doing or not doing –is more crucial than a few talk shows and a couple of news casts. In 
the case of Rwanda, Dallaire says, that is where the process broke down‒the events in Rwanda 
simply did not break through to such an extent as to create momentum (Dallaire, 1999:15). 
“I felt that one good journalist on the ground was worth a battalion of troops, because I 
realized they could bring pressure to bear,” Roméo Dallaire (1999:16) talking about his 
experience of 1994 Genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda. He accuses the media in Rwanda, 
especially radio, to have played an exceptionally role in the genocide. The country is known as a 
“radio country” and at the time of the killing, in the camp of the displaced and refugees, you 
could still find people with portable radios.  
RTLM was created specifically as a tool of the genocidaires to dehumanize the Tutsi lay 
the groundwork then literally driven the killing once the genocide started. The great 
handicap for UNAMIR (in the effect the representative on the ground of the world 
community) was our initial ignorance of what was really happening and the mixed 
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messages. UNAMIR had so little capacity to monitor broadcasts, particularly those in 
local language, Kinyarwanda. We were unarmed in the media war that was going on and 
had virtually no capacity to explain (Dallaire, 1999:16).  
 
Nevertheless, Chalk (1990) had recommended three possible forms of intervention in the 
situation where media are being manipulated: early-stage interventions in conﬂict situations 
where mass killing has not begun; medium-stage interventions in societies just beginning to 
suffer genocidal massacres; and late-stage interventions launched when genocide is underway, 
which could require actually destroying the transmitters and printing presses of the hate media 
outlets. In fact, Dallaire tempted Chalk’s recommendation but in vain. He says he repeatedly 
asked for the capacity to jam RTLM, but the request was denied. According to Dallaire,  the 
argument was that this would amount to a violation of state sovereignty and there also was a very 
high cost attached to maintaining jamming equipments. In Dallaire’s view, it was time to 
question the absolute of state sovereignty and to ask whether it was becoming an impediment to 
humanity (Thomson, 1999:16).  
When RTLM started to attack, not only the mission, but also myself when RTLM was 
launching its description of how to kill it was obvious to everyone that RTLM was 
operating without any rules. It was beyond rules. It was beyond limits. And it was an 
overt instrument of genocide (Thomson, 1999:16) quoting Roméo Dallaire, the Chief 
Commander of UNAMIR before and during the genocide. 
The media can be both a weapon and a conscience to humanity. Journalists can be 
powerful, individually and collectively. But they can also be manipulated very easily if the depth 
of the subject is not there.  
For future journalists, Dallaire advises: 
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Get yourselves a lot more cultured; learn some geography, some anthropology, some 
sociology and maybe some philosophy. Bring more depth to your questions and to your 
analysis. Stay dynamic in the search for the truth, for you are an instrument of the 
absolute called ‘justice’. If you abdicate or if you are perfunctory, then we will all be 
weakened.  
Media plays three main roles in society: informing, educating and entertaining. In the 
case of Rwanda, Radio Rwanda which was the national radio played some of these roles in spite 
of the lack of independence. First, Radio Rwanda’s main role was to inform. It was the only tool 
to reach the entire population including illiterate people and those living in remote villages, and 
was one of the most efficient way the government used to send messages to the population 
(J.Fichery Dukulizima, 2014:13). Dukuliziman points out that for decades it remained the best 
way citizens in rural areas could know what is happening in other parts of the country or 
internationally because it broadcast news several times a day in different languages.  
Desforges (2007) also estimates that before the genocide Radio Rwanda played an 
informative role, which was somewhat positive: In addition to the usual news, the radio 
broadcast official notification of appointments to and dismissals from government posts, 
announcements of government meetings and lists of candidates admitted to secondary schools 
[...]. Deforges argues, however, that so long as Rwanda was a single party state – that is until 
June 1991 – the radio also disseminated propaganda for the president's party, the MRND 
(Desforges 2007: 42).  
Apart from informing, Radio Rwanda played an educative role as well. Radio programs 
on health, agriculture or youth were regularly on air and radios “broadcast daily reminders from 
the president, exhorting Rwandans to work hard and live clean moral lives” (Desforges, 2007: 
42).  Although controlled by an authoritative government, Radio Rwanda contributed to the 
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development of the country for decades by educating citizens. When it came to entertainment, 
Radio Rwanda played some Rwandese music and promoted Rwandan singers, but did not do 
enough in the view of Rwandan youth who enjoyed gossip, talk shows and music more than 
government announcements (Dukulizimana, 2014:13-14). 
According to Dukulizimana, Radio RTLM, which started in 1993, filled this gap and 
easily attracted many listeners. He insists that when the civil war started on October 1st 1990, 
Radio Rwanda not only played its normal educative and informative role, but also became a 
propaganda tool to fight against the rebel group. Reports from the northern prefecture of Byumba 
and Ruhengeri, where the civil war started, were aimed at convincing the public that the 
Rwandan army was winning over the rebel army (Dukulizimana, 2014:14). As the war escalated 
ethnic tensions; print media, version of RTLM, started to show up.   
The most popular example of such papers is Kangura that was spreading hate speech and 
cartoons dehumanizing Tutsis. With political influence and competition with other local radios, 
the tone and rhetoric of Radio Rwanda also changed, and the station was used to incite killing for 
the first time in March 1992, as described by Desforges (2007: 42):  
On 3 March, the radio repeatedly broadcast a communiqué supposedly sent by a human 
rights group based in Nairobi warning that Hutu in Bugesera would be attacked by Tutsi. 
Local officials built on the radio announcement to convince Hutu that they needed to 
protect themselves by attacking first. Led by soldiers from a nearby military base, Hutu 
civilians, members of the Interahamwe, a militia attached to the MRND party, and local 
Hutu civilians attacked and killed hundreds of Tutsi.  
Deforges says that after this incident, politicians became aware more than ever of the 
power of the media to mobilize people, and in 1991, media was liberalized and new media 
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outlets started, some of them critical to the government. Publications like Kanguka which means 
“wake up” and Kangura “wake him/ her up” in Kinyarwanda started operating. 
  While most of the newspapers were conveying a certain political ideology but the 
message could not reach the normal citizens in rural areas, most of politicians knew radio was 
the best way to reach people. Deforges (2007) reminds that within the transitional government - 
in which opposition parties were included - the newly created Ministry of Information was a key 
position and the opposition did its best -successfully- to control it. During this period, some 
journalists were pressured to obey the orders and report bias and those who did not obey were 
pressured to resign, (Alexis and Mpambara, 2003; Dukulizimana, 2014:13). 
Dukulizimana (2014) and Alexis and Mpambara (2003) points out that with the 
transitional governments and the multi-partism, some of Radio Rwanda’s journalists- whose five 
out of fifty were Tutsis in the early 1990s- protested twice, in 1992 and in 1993. Radio Rwanda’s 
staff went on strike to demand more freedom to work, a clearer and more precise editorial line 
and more material resources (Alexis and Mpambara, 2003: 10). The situation changed and there 
have been some positive changes in terms of freedom of work. However, unable to fully use the 
government owned media and control the information flow, some politicians thought of other 
ways to communicate messages to the people (Dukulizimana, 2014:16). 
 It is in the above framework that RTLM (Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines), the 
first private owned radio station in Rwanda which became operational in August 1993, was born 
and put an end to the monopoly of Radio Rwanda. According to Dukulizimana, this was the 
initiative of politicians close to the Habyarimana regime, who were facing the need to mobilize 
people and spread their propaganda. The rebel group Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) also had its 
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own radio: Radio Muhabura (named after the Muhabura volcano, an extinct volcano situated on 
the border of Rwanda and Uganda).  
Broadcasting from exile and airing RPF ideology, it is not surprising that Radio RTLM 
considered Radio Muhabura as its rival, but Radio Muhabura could not reach all the corners of 
the country (Mironko, 2007: 130). Mironko reveals that when the genocide began, in addition to 
dozens of newspapers and three main radio stations that were broadcasting for the Rwandan 
audience, many international radio stations including Voice of America (VOA) and the British 
Broadcast Corporation (BBC) could be heard on Frequency Modulation (FM), but were 
understood by less than 10% of the population because they were broadcasting in foreign 
languages. 
III.1.2.	  Success	  of	  hate	  media	  in	  Rwanda	  Genocide	  against	  Tutsi	  
 
This part critically presents the role of RTLM in propagating division’s messages, its 
content and its effect on ethnic conflicts in Rwanda. According to Strauss (2007), from its early 
launch, RTLM seemed to be a dominant radio station in Rwanda.  It has been described as “a 
radio machete”,“hate radio”, “voice of genocide”, “radio dispatcher of murder”, and other 
sobriquets (Strauss, 2007: 612-613). But how could have such a young radio station had a quick 
impact on the whole territory of Rwanda in a so short time? RTLM started its broadcasting in the 
summer of 1993, the same year the Arusha Peace Accords were signed between the Rwandan 
Government and the RPF. Ironically, the signatories of the Arusha Peace Accords agreed to put 
an end to the propaganda, which was considered a key element in raising tension (Desforges, 
2007: 44).  
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Unlike Radio Rwanda, which did not see the value in entertaining its listeners, RTLM’s 
programming was made of political commentary, lively and informal debates, mixed with good 
humour and the latest music such as popular Congolese music (Desforges, 2007: 44). It quickly 
attracted a large audience, particularly among young people. Chalk (1999), one of the leading 
genocide scholars, studied the major functions of mass media in the genocide and, however, 
concluded that to say that RTLM broadcast hatred is to refer to the role of media to misinform 
and demonize a specific group of people.  
Desforges (2007), investigated the role of Radio RTLM in the lead-up to the 1994 
genocide and argued that the killing of the Burundian President in 1993 and the massacres that 
followed were broadcast in Rwanda by Radio RTLM, which reported the assassination of the 
Burundian President in a much sensational fashion in order to portray the cruelty of the Tutsis 
and intensify the fears of the Hutus. In fact, President Ndadaye was killed by a ballonet blow to 
the chest, but RTLM goes on to talk about torture and castration (Desforges,2007: 45).  
The killing of Ndadaye and the biased way it was reported by radios in Rwanda, possibly 
gave a rise to mistrust among Rwandans and aggravated hatred among Hutus and Tutsis 
(Dukulizimana, 2014:18). On the eve of the genocide, RTLM repeated anti-Tutsi propaganda 
with the aim to demonize them. During the 1994 genocide, its broadcast became virulent, and 
messages of hate became familiar on the airwaves (Desdorges, 1999:191).  
The radio insisted on many controversial and divisive themes like the inherent differences 
between Hutu and Tutsi, the numerical superiority of the Hutu, the cleverness of the Tutsi 
in infiltration, their cruelty, their cohesiveness, their intention to restore past repression, 
the risk they posed to the gains of the 1959 revolution, and, above all, their plan to 
exterminate the Hutu (Desforges, 1999: 191).  
 
86	  
	  
Kimani (2007), however, argues that RTLM was not responsible for introducing the 
language and ideology of hate among Rwandans. Such a language and ideology already existed 
in Rwanda as a form of social construct involving ethnic identity,” (Kimani 2007: 110). This 
framework had been developed by radical newspapers in the months following the beginning of 
the civil war, and RTLM relied on the political situation to use them in its commentary, 
arguments and interpretations of issues demonizing the intended victims and encouraging mass 
participation in the genocide are two of the main roles media can play (Chalk, 1999).  
To understand Radio RTLM, it is very important to separate the following two themes 
highlighted by Chalk (1999): RTLM succeeded in reaching more people than newspapers and 
other media outlets not only because of its character as mass media, but also because of the way 
its journalists used their talent to attract audiences. These journalists are referred to as “stars 
animateurs”; they would use humoristic language, salute individual people, and issue personal 
greetings to specific regions of Rwanda (Li, 2007: 101, Desforges, 2007:44). 
RTLM also gave directives, acting as the voice of authority, and ordinary citizens 
sometimes obeyed (Dukulizimana, 2014:19). He says that during the genocide, the commentary 
became more dangerous and the journalists openly incited the killings. The most popular RTLM 
journalist, Habimana Kantano, openly gave orders and asked listeners to kill inkotanyi: “Fight 
them with the weapons that you have at hand. You have arrows, you have spears...go after those 
inkotanyi, blood flows in their veins as it does in yours...”  
According to Desforges (1999), one announcer promised the listeners that a “shining 
day” would dawn when there would be not a single Inyenzi left in the country. The role of 
RTLM in promoting hatred and calling people to kill each other has attracted many scholars and 
researchers who wrote a number of books and articles on the topic. It is now of general 
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knowledge that those broadcasts had an impact during the genocide against Tutsi. However, 
whether RTLM’s broadcasts were the main cause of the genocide remains a debatable issue. 
Dukulizimana (2014), points out that as some communication theorists disagree on the 
impact of media to influence the audience, there are also controversial conclusions about the role 
and impact of Radio RTLM in fueling the 1994 hardship of the Genocide against Tutsi. 
Nonetheless, on which basis could this assumption be valued?   
Inkotanyi means “a warrior” and it was the name of RPF fighters since 1990. During the 
genocide it was used to refer not only to RPF fighters, but also to its supporters.  Inyenzi 
means cockroaches. It was a pejorative name given to RPF fighters and supporters during 
the genocide. Inyenzi could mean a Tutsi, an accomplice or an associate of RPA. During 
the genocide, “Inyenzi” and “Inkotanyi” were used almost interchangeably by 
propagandists (Dukulizimana, 2014:19). 
For the Genocide against Tutsi, significant debates on the role media, themselves, may 
have played to encourage people to commit acts of genocide still surface the research field. 
Researchers admit that RTLM broadcasts had large-scale and direct effects on behavior (Strauss, 
2007: 614). Scholars and journalists like Thompson (2007), Melven (2000) and others accuse the 
hate radio to have played a critical role in prompting ordinary citizens to violence.  
RTLM radio was a propaganda weapon unlike any other, its campaign was to demonize 
the Tutsi, and its purpose was to prepare the people of Rwanda for the genocide (Melvern 2000: 
71). Melven states that the influence of hate radio must never be underestimated. According to 
Dukulizimana (2014), such claims establish and support a strong link between the radio 
broadcasts and the massacres. This direct effect of media, which can be compared to the 
controversial “hypodermic needle” of communication is nevertheless contested by Strauss (2007) 
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and other media and genocide scholars, although a minority in the literature (Dukulizimana, 
2014:20).  
The third category, most of them less known in the literature, have moderate views on the 
impact of radio. Li, who passed three months of fieldwork in Rwanda doing interviews with 
dozens of perpetrators “distances himself from claims that radio had direct media effects capable 
of instantly causing violence” (Strauss, 2007: 613; Dukulizimana, 2014: 20). His critics put the 
radio impact analysis in the context of the genocide where thousands of people were either 
victims or perpetrators and states that the intangible power of radio in the particular context “did 
not rest solely in words, memory, the psyche, the state or some combination of causal factors, but 
was produced in the process of articulation and rearticulation by animateurs and listeners” (Li, 
2007: 105; Dukulizimana, 2014:20). He critically insists on the themes of radio “implicating 
rather than manipulating its listeners, informing but not determining their choices” (Li, 2007: 
104-105). 
Rwandan media analysts Charles Mironko and Jean Marie Vianney Higiro are perhaps 
the few researchers who can understand the original message broadcast by RTLM, because most 
of the broadcasts were in Kinyarwanda, the local language. They admit that media had some 
effect but the media alone cannot account for citizen mobilization during the genocide (Strauss, 
2007: 613; Dukulizimana, 2014:20). In interviews with Mironko (2007), convicted genocide 
perpetrators, stated that most ordinary Rwandan peasants did not receive orders directly from 
RTLM, they rather heard some message from others. Mironko, therefore, concludes that RTLM 
was not the main cause of them killing and that other reasons need to be explored. After 
interviews with convicted genocide perpetrators, Strauss (2007) also contradicted literature on 
the 1994 genocide against Tutsi. He also concludes that “radio alone cannot account for either 
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the onset of most genocidal violence or the participation of most perpetrators” (Strauss, 2007: 
611).  
However, other researchers have used “content analysis” to validate the effect of RTLM 
in the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi. Within the available scripts at hand of Kimani (2007), it easy 
to detect message of hate and division, where RTLM journalists –animators were clearly making 
a distinction between “us” and “them” and calling on “us” to defend ourselves against “them” 
(Kimani2007: 119). Kimani (2007) went far drawing statistics to reveal common RTLM 
inflammatory broadcasts which consist: a) allegations of rebel atrocities (16.32 %), b) allegations 
that RPA members were not Rwandans and formed part of a regional conspiracy to dominate 
Tutsis and set up a Tutsi–Hima empire in Central Africa took up 7.05 % of the broadcasts, and c) 
allegations that the RPA wanted to take over the country and reinstate the monarchy, subjugating 
all Hutus, accounted for 5.89 %, (Kimani2007: 119). 
The same statistics reveal that direct calls for the extermination of members of the RPA 
and all its supporters, as well as congratulatory messages on the extermination of RPA members 
and supporters – Inyenzi, Inkotanyi, and accomplices –took up 9.16 % of the broadcasts. Other 
allegations included statements that Tutsi civilians were part of a plan by Tutsis to take over 
power in the Great Lakes region of Africa, that Tutsi civilians were actively exterminating 
Hutus, making such plans, or supporting them (2.17 %); that RPA members killed president 
Habyarimana, precipitating the unrest in the country (2.78 %); that some political parties were 
helping the RPA (2.50 %) and death threats to Hutu supporters of the RPA and members of 
UNAMIR (United Nations Mission in Rwanda) (Kimani2007: 119).  
Dukulizima (2014) writes that the tone on RTLM was belligerent; the ideology was 
consistently pro-government, nationalist, virulently anti-rebel, and hostile to Tutsis in general. 
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However, Strauss’s content analysis of the available full transcripts from the high genocide 
period complicate the “Radio Machete” image of a station openly and repeatedly calling for 
genocide (Strauss, 2007: 625). Although law is different from social sciences research, the ICTR 
(International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) concluded that radio played a role in the genocide 
and sentenced three men (Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, Ferdinand Nahimana and Georges Ruggio) 
for the genocidal role they played through RTLM (Dukulizimana, 2014:23).  He states that the 
Tribunal, which established a causal relationship, at least in part, between the broadcast and the 
genocide, states that incitement to genocide itself constitutes a crime.  
Quoting the ICTR, Dukulizimana writes that the Tribunal documented cases where Tutsis 
were killed because their names were read on the airwaves, like the case of Desire 
Nshunguyinka, who was killed at a roadblock with his wife, sister and brother-in-law, after 
RTLM broadcast the license number of the car they were travelling in, announcing that a vehicle 
with these plates was carrying Inkotanyi (ICTR, 2007: 163). The ICTR Appeals chamber 
concluded that the RTLM broadcasts after April 6, 1994 substantially contributed to the killing 
of these individuals (ICTR, 2007: 162-163). 
III.2. Post Genocide Laws and Freedom of Speech and Press 
Freedom 
III.2.1.	  Media	  related	  Laws	  and	  Freedom	  of	  Expression	  
Previous chapters have explored the hardship event of the Genocide against Tutsi and the 
theoretical side of the press freedom and freedom of speech. Factual assumptions that the 
Government of Rwanda, has, with excess zeal, opted for protecting the society against the 
recidivism of the 1994 events lead us to a critical analysis to thoroughly understand how and by 
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which means the government pursue this path. In a fragile society like Rwanda that underwent 
the tragic history of the genocide, and that still has factions imbedded in the culture, it sounds 
hardly possible to dress laws that equally protect all the strata of the society and that all citizens 
could go along with. The Genocide Ideology Law and Media laws are some of the strategies 
used by the GoR to safeguard the country that are most questioned by scholars, researchers, 
human rights organizations and political opponents.  
Regarding the legal environment, constitutional protection of media freedom is 
important, but it can also be misleading (Witten-Woodring, 2009:599). For example, Turkey has 
constitutional provisions for media freedom, but it also has laws that criminalize reporting on 
some politically sensitive issues including depicting as genocide the killing of one and a half 
million Armenians in 1915 (Freedom House 2007b; Van Belle 2000). In recent years, the 
government of Rwanda has embarked on an ambitious economic development strategy that aims, 
among other things, to create a vibrant industry for information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) and position Rwanda as a regional ICT hub (MYICT, 2012). But do Rwanda laws, 
particularly genocide related and media laws, allow a free and fair exploitation of these ICTs in 
accordance with the declaration of the fundamental human rights including press freedom and 
speech freedom?  
Freedom House (2013) claims that while ICT development has been among the top 
priorities for the Rwandan government, the country’s tenuous political environment and sensitive 
ethnic relations since the 1994 genocide has led the government to exert some controls over 
online content and expression. As illustration, a few critical news websites that were previously 
blocked in 2010-2011 were intermittently inaccessible in Rwanda throughout 2012 and early 
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2013, though a number of critical blogs were unavailable altogether. Freedom House goes on 
saying that worries remain that the government’s firm restrictions on print and broadcast 
media—particularly on contentious content concerning the ruling party and the 1994 genocide—
will cross over into the internet sphere, as occurred when the authorities blocked the online 
version of an independent newspaper in the lead-up to the 2010 presidential election. 
Nevertheless, there were no reported cases of imprisonment or violence against online journalists 
or internet users in 2012-2013. 
Positive amendments to the 2009 Media Law were adopted in March 2013, providing 
journalists with the “right to seek, receive, give and broadcast information and ideas through 
media.” The same amendments also explicitly recognize freedom for online communications. 
Nevertheless, the passage of the new law has led to some fears of increasing government control 
over the establishment of online outlets (Freedom House, 2013). The Media High Council-a 
government controlled institution, systematically monitors all print and broadcast media 
coverage during the country’s annual genocide mourning period every April, and for the first 
time during Rwanda’s 18th commemoration period in April 2012 the monitoring of online media 
was incorporated (MHC, 2012).   
Freedom House (2013) also warns of the legislative initiatives in 2012 to expand the 
surveillance and interception capabilities of security authorities, and the increasing of indications 
that the government may be systematically monitoring and intercepting e-mail and other private 
communications.  According to Reporters without Borders (2013), in 2012 and early 2013, a 
number of independent online news outlets and opposition blogs were intermittently inaccessible 
in Rwanda, though it is uncertain whether the disruptions were due to deliberate government 
interference, as was the case in past years, or to technical issues. Reporters without Borders, 
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however, states that users increased their engagement with social media tools in the past year and 
have become more vocal in criticizing the government.  
Although the government of Rwanda has been committed to expanding access to ICTs 
across the country, it has also simultaneously endeavored to restrict the types of content that 
users can access, particularly news content of oppositional nature (Reporters without Borders, 
2010). For example, in June 2010 the Media High Council ordered the website of the online 
version of the independent paper Umuvugizi to be blocked after its print version was suspended 
in April 2010, arguing that the ban on the newspaper applied to the online version as well 
(Reporters without Borders, 2010).  Reporters without Borders point out that Umuvugizi was 
unblocked after its six-month suspension period had expired, though it has reportedly 
experienced periodic blocking in the years since, including in 2012 and early 2013. Some 
opposition sites continue to be blocked on some ISPs as of early 2013, 
including Umusingi and Inyenyeri News, which were both first blocked in 2011. 
 
Freedom House (2010) admits, however, that meanwhile, social-networking sites such as 
YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and international blog-hosting services are freely available. The 
websites of international human rights organizations such as Freedom House, Amnesty 
International, and Human Rights Watch, as well as the online versions of media outlets like the 
BBC, Le Monde, Radio France Internationale, the New York Times, and many others are freely 
accessible. Websites of national news outlets are also easily accessible. These include the web 
versions of state-run media and pro-government outlets as well as independent outlets such 
as The Rwanda Focus, Rushyashya, The Chronicles, Umusanzu and Rwanda Dispatch. Most 
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radio stations are accessible online, either through their own websites and blogs, or through 
social media. 
 
A local website entitled Itangazamakuru (2012) points out that as a result of the more 
limited space for press freedom in the traditional media sphere, Rwandan media outlets are 
increasingly going online to avoid government control or suspension as well as heavy production 
costs.  Itangazamakuru states that the economic environment for online news websites remains a 
challenge for independent outlets, particularly in comparison to their state-run counterparts that 
receive income from government advertisements and direct subsidies. According to a 2010 law 
relating to electronic messages, signatures and transactions, intermediaries and service providers 
are not held liable for the content transmitted through their networks.  
According to Great Lakes Voices (2011), Media High Council reportedly operates an 
online monitoring department to screen web content, and has been known to contact websites to 
request the removal of certain information. Great Lakes Voices gives examples of two online 
news websites, Umusingi and Umurabyo that have experienced such requests to delete content 
related to local political affairs and ethnic relations in recent years. In mid-2013, an independent 
test conducted by Freedom House found a number of opposition blogs inaccessible altogether; 
however, it is uncertain whether those sites were taken down out of the owners’ own accord or 
due to external pressure to do so. Appeals can be made through the Media High Council, though 
they are not often successful, according to journalists. 
 
Freedom House (2012) says that online journalists based in Rwanda are joining their 
print and broadcast colleagues in exercising self-censorship, particularly on topics that can be 
construed as disruptive to national unity and reconciliation. According to some journalists, self-
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censorship is viewed as a legitimate practice given the country’s sensitive social and political 
environment (Freedom House, 2012). However, the increase of social media tools serve as 
alternative tools for Rwandans to discuss issues that were formerly taboo and not open to public 
discussion due to fears of persecution. Freedom House gives an example of President Kagame’s 
succession following the end of his current term in 2017 that has been debated in various media 
with diverging views. A number of citizens support Kagame’s reelection, which would require a 
constitutional amendment to increase presidential term limits, while others oppose Kagame’s 
efforts to prolong his tenure and suggest a peaceful transition to a new leadership (Shyaka 
Kanuma, 2012).  
 
Freedom House considers the expansion of internet access as a factor enabling the 
Rwandan blogosphere to evolve into a vibrant platform for expression, even though the websites 
and blogs of opposition activists both within and outside Rwanda are inconsistently available. 
Facebook and Twitter are also emerging as popular platforms for online interaction, in part as a 
result of the increasing use of internet-enabled phones. MTN Rwanda, a telecommunication 
company, introduced a “SMS to Twitter” tool to facilitate the social media platform’s use for 
people who do not have easy access to the internet on computers (MTN, 2013). The president is 
an active supporter of these social networks, occasionally using the platforms to engage in 
discussions with users and openly respond to issues concerning the current state of governance in 
the country. According to Allan Brian Ssenyonga (2012), by the end of 2012, Kagame emerged 
as one of the most popular African presidents on Twitter with nearly 95,000 followers. 
 
Freedom House (2012) states that with mobile phones more widely accessible than the 
internet, text messages have become another important channel for citizens to voice discontent 
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with the authorities and expose abuses of power. The live radio programs, “Good Morning 
Rwanda” and “Good Evening Rwanda,” which are broadcast on the radio; Flash FM, are the 
most popular paths for citizens to criticize government malpractices via SMS messages. For 
example, in July 2013, citizens challenged the education ministry over the suspension of 
students’ bursaries. According to Freedom House (2012), however, the ability of citizens to use 
digital media for organizing large-scale street protests remains limited due to broader restrictions 
on freedom of assembly, particularly regarding politically sensitive topics. 
 
III.2.2.	  Legislative	  violates	  Press	  Freedom	  and	  Speech	  Freedom	  
According to Freedom House (2012), legislative initiatives in 2012 and early 2013 had 
both positive and negative effects on freedom of expression and internet freedom in Rwanda, 
including amendments to the 2009 Media Law, an Access to Information Law, and a revised law 
on the interception of communications. SIM card registration requirements were also launched in 
2013.  
Freedom House claims that Article 34 of the Rwandan constitution, adopted in May 
2003, provides for freedom of the press and freedom of information, but in practice, the 
government maintains tight control over the media. In March 2013, the state adopted progressive 
amendments to the 2009 Media Law, granting journalists the “right to seek, receive, give and 
broadcast information and ideas through media” and explicitly providing for freedom of online 
communications in Section 3, Article 19.  Nonetheless, the passage of the new law (Official 
Gazette, 2013) has led to some fears of increasing government control over the internet, (IFEX, 
2012) with the freedom of expression organization Article 19 criticizing the law for containing 
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“too many provisions which pose a threat to journalists and the independence of the media, 
including online media.” 
While a revised Access to Information Law was passed in December 2012 and is 
expected to allow journalists to conduct investigative journalism with more official and credible 
sources of information, Frank Kanyesigye (2013) states that the extent to which the media should 
have the unchecked right to free expression is often a matter of public debate in Rwanda, with 
some commentators suggesting that Rwanda’s media practitioners should be cautious in their 
speech as long as the history of genocide continues to haunts the country. For David Kabuye 
(2012), while there are no laws that specifically restrict internet content or criminalize online 
expression, Rwanda’s generally restrictive legal provisions governing the traditional media could 
be applied to the internet, particularly given the lack of a fully independent judiciary. IFEX 
(2012) points out that the decision to ban the online version of Umuvugizi in 2011 was based on 
charges of publishing “divisive language, “a category of expression that is criminalized by the 
2001 Law on Discrimination and Sectarianism. 
 
III.2.3.	  Genocide	  related	  laws	  and	  press	  freedom	  and	  Speech	  freedom	  
According to Freedom House (2012), a vague 2008 law against “genocide ideology” 
similarly threatens freedom of expression both online and off, prescribing heavy prison sentences 
and fines for any offender “who disseminates genocide ideology in public through documents, 
speeches, pictures, media or any other means.”  Article 3 of the Genocide Ideology Law 
determines the characteristics of the genocide ideology. The crime of genocide ideology is 
characterized in any behavior manifested by acts aimed at dehumanizing a person or a group of 
persons with the same characteristics in the following manner:  
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1. Threatening, intimidating, degrading through defamatory speeches, documents or actions 
which aim at propounding wickedness or inciting hatred;  
2. Marginalizing, laughing at one’s misfortune, defaming, mocking, boasting, despising, 
degrading creating  confusion aiming at negating the genocide which occurred, stiring up ill 
feelings, taking revenge, altering testimony or evidence for the genocide which occurred;  
3. Killing, planning to kill or attempting to kill someone for purposes of furthering genocide 
ideology.  
Amnesty International (2010), Rwanda's laws banning "genocide ideology" and 
"sectarianism" are vague and sweeping, and have been used to silence legitimate dissent. The 
laws were designed to encourage unity and restrict speech that could lead to hatred. However, 
they have had dangerous and chilling effect on Rwandan society (Amnesty International, 
2010:1). This report calls on the government of Rwanda to ensure that, while outlawing acts of 
genocide and incitement to genocide, it upholds its international obligations to respect and 
protect freedom of expression.  
Individuals have exploited gaps in the law for personal gain, including the discrediting of 
teachers, for local political capital, and in the context of land disputes or personal 
conflicts. Several “genocide ideology” and “divisionism” charges based on flimsy 
evidence resulted in acquittals, but often after the accused spent several months in pre-
trial detention. Many such accusations should have been more thoroughly investigated, 
but broad laws offer little guidance to the police and prosecution (Amnesty International, 
2010:14).   
According to Jane Nishimwe (2013), reacting to criticisms of the law’s overly broad 
nature, the minister of justice proposed amendments in November 2012 that aim to make the law 
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more definitive and easier to interpret.  Times Live (2013) states that in July 2013, the amended 
law reduces prison sentences from 25 years to a maximum of nine and requires proof of criminal 
intent behind an offending act that must be “characterized by thoughts based on ethnicity, 
religion, nationality or race to foment genocide [or] support genocide.” Emmanuel R. Karake 
(2013), however, notes that the law still restricts freedom of expression by retaining the notion of 
“genocide ideology” as a criminal offense and by excluding a clear distinction between a private 
conversation and public speech. 
III.3. Conclusion 
The 1994 Genocide against Tutsi has been a very terrible event stuck in the memories of 
Rwandans and it is frustrating for not only those who experienced it in different ways but also 
for generations and generations to come. Measures, including laws such as Genocide Ideology 
Law and Media Law, have been taken to safeguard this fragile society avoiding the repetition of 
such a tragic event. However, as realized in this chapter, human rights organizations and 
activists, media‒especially international media and political opponents view these undertaken 
measures as a strategy to silence any dissident to the current regime in Rwanda.  The following 
chapter will comprise of a compilation of how Rwandans, in Rwanda, themselves, media 
industries and human rights activists inland view this issue and where possible how to remedy it.  
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CHAPTER	  IV:	  RESEARCH	  DELIMITATION,	  INTERPRETATION	  AND	  
ANALYSIS	  OF	  FIELD	  DATA	  
IV.0. Introduction 
As mentioned in the general introduction, this study used techniques such as interviews, 
questionnaires, group discussions, discourse analysis and personal experiences to gather various 
views from media professionals, media houses, government officials, human rights organizations 
and some security officials to appraise press freedom and speech freedom in human security in 
Rwanda. Among key respondents were journalists with more than 5 years of experience and 
from different media houses with divergent editorial lines, editors also from different media, Pax 
Press-an organization that serves simultaneously as a human rights organization and a press 
agency, the Media High Council (MHC), Rwanda Media Commission (RMC)-an agency in 
charge of media self regulatory and the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB). The researcher also 
got a chance to hear from high profile military officials regarding the press freedom and national 
security. 
The purpose of this research was to analyze the consequences of the genocide and hate 
media on human rights in Rwanda, especially freedom of speech and press freedom. The study 
had, therefore, analyzed the role of media in 1994 Genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda with 
emphasis on hate media. It also assessed different steps undertaken by the post genocide Rwanda 
media to avoid the recidivism of fatal errors committed by their fellow pioneers and it had a look 
at the relationship between human security and freedom of speech.  The research could not 
conclude without critically appraising the relationship between governance and freedom of 
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speech and press freedom with intent to recommend the GoR on how to regulate media without 
necessarily imposing restrictions on speech freedom.  
This chapter, therefore, presents field data, analyses them and interprets the research 
findings of this study entitled: “Freedom of Expression and Speech Freedom in Human Security 
in Rwanda.” The researcher presents the study findings and discusses them basing on the 
research objectives and research questions. The chapter is divided into four main sections. The 
first section evaluates the media censorship. This section looks at three subsections which are 
media self censorship, government censorship and attitudes and behavior of consumers of rights. 
The second section deals with the relationship between the genocidal government (the pre-
genocide GoR) and hate media while the third section looks at the possible lessons Rwandan 
journalists might have learnt from the negative experience of their predecessors. The last section 
but not the least looks into the lessons that the current GoR could have learnt from the 
relationship between hate media and the genocidal government. 
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IV.1. Factors hindering press freedom and speech freedom 
in Rwanda 
 
Officials from Media High Council, RGB, RURA and RBA at a consultative dialogue assessing 
the implementation of media reforms held at Lemigo Hotel in Kigali. 
IV.1.1	  Media	  censorship	  
IV.1.1.1.	  Media	  self	  censorship	  
Data collected from different journalists, media managers, human rights activists, 
government officials and individuals depicts that there is still little freedom of speech and press 
freedom in Rwanda. However, respondents diverge on reasons hindering people in Rwanda, 
particularly journalists, from speaking out their minds and publishing some types of information. 
Out of those reasons, they mention categories of journalists depending on their own personality, 
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the lack of required knowledge and tap on media themselves and their editorial lines. Along with 
professional issues, behaviors of individuals in the government are also evoked. 
IV.1.1.2.	  Lack	  of	  minimum	  required	  journalistic	  skills	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  self	  
censorship	  
Some respondents argue that the lack of press freedom is due to the personality of 
journalists themselves and the lack of journalism trainings. During the media dialogue meeting, a 
meeting that gathered media experts from around Africa, on April 3rd 2014, to talk about the 
future of media and journalism in Africa, participants pointed out that some journalists base their 
stories more on emotions than on facts. Didace Niyifasha, Program Director of a Christian local 
radio “Inkoramutima”, giving an example of Ngeze Hasani, one of the journalists who were 
convicted by ICTR for genocide perpetration and using media to sow hatred among Rwandans,  
says some of the journalists did not have neither formal nor professional education.  
Niyifasha says Ngeze was a cobbler before he joined journalism on a mission impelled by 
some government officials. Along with Ngeze, as confirms Niyifasha, there were and there are 
still journalists in Rwanda who fall in this category. For this reason, media experts and media 
professionals accuse some of their colleagues of being propagandists commissioned by 
treacherous politicians. They give the example of those being arrested as convicted of betraying 
the country. “Those are not journalists! There is another power behind inciting them and pushing 
them into journalism,” says Didace Niyifasha. 
In addition, participants in the media dialogue argue that a journalist may abstain from 
covering a given story either depending on his limited knowledge of the matter or simply 
because of his motivation to be a journalist. Pointing at categories of journalists in Rwanda they 
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said that there some who joined journalism because it is their vocation and most of these ones 
pursued journalism studies and they really want to be voices of the voiceless people. Others 
joined for survival because they could not get any other jobs while some others joined just 
because they had a dream to become super stars. 
  According to Niyifasha it is very difficult to harmonize these categories and have 
solidarity within journalism in Rwanda. “This is why there is always confrontation between 
journalists and politicians. As some of the politicians are not honest involving themselves into 
corruption cases, public fund embezzlement, appropriating themselves individuals’ properties, 
etc, use such inefficient journalists to clean their dirty names,” says R1, a participant also in the 
media dialogue. 
IV.1.1.3.	  Social	  responsibility	  and	  self	  censorship	  
A number of Rwandan journalists consider Rwandan journalism at crossroads from the 
time when the government, for the first time, enacted laws that guarantee freedom of information 
and self-regulation on the media’s part. Some still critically wonder how flexible can these laws 
be in regard with discussions on issues related to the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi.  R2, a 
journalist for The New Times, a daily newspaper in Rwanda, argues that journalists have to 
figure out a balance between their freedoms as journalists and their responsibility to their 
audience. “This one is still extremely jittery and sensitive,” he said. 
Similarly, R3, a famous journalist in Kigali hosting controversial programs that engage 
government officials and the audience into debates, finds it important to self censor in the 
public’s interests.  Acknowledging his self censorship, there are two confronting sides in the 
motivation pushing him to self censorship. He stated: “I am always careful about the words I use 
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so as not to aggravate some wounds or to sound as trivializing or denying Genocide.” There is at 
the one hand a positive and responsible feeling, not to aggravate healing wounds and at the other 
hand the fear of falling into a trap of the genocide ideology and genocide denial which carry 
heavy punishments as explained in previous parts.  
According to Assouman Niyonambaza, also a famous journalist in Rwanda; Owner and 
Chief Editor of Rugari Newspaper, journalism is not something easy. “It is a fight. The right is 
fought for,” he said in a radio program on Radio Rwanda on April 3rd, 2014 while in the Media 
Dialogue, insisting however that people should put on balance the importance of the information 
and then it is up to the conscience of each and every journalist to publish/air or take a risk to 
protect people’s interests. Niyonambaza, nonetheless, clears the image of the government saying 
that the government does not prevent any person from speaking out his or her mind. He also puts 
such a responsibility of violation of speech freedom and press freedom on some individuals in 
the government silencing media in their own interests. He says some individuals stop newspapers 
from getting printed in the government publishing house and /or stop them from entering in the 
country once printed abroad as almost all private papers are printed in Uganda. 
IV.1.2.	  Government	  censorship	  
In an interview with media houses’ owners and editors, they told the researcher that their 
daily work is to make the listeners enjoy their freedom of speech. R4 a Radio News Editor with 
experience of seven years in that position said his work is made possible by the fact that his 
sources are free to speak.  “Otherwise we can’t find the content that can attract the audience and 
the market (advertisers),” he stated. However, media in Rwanda are in ambivalent state to please 
the government and still serve their publics satisfactorily.  
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5 out of 5 of those who responded to the question whether they are free to publish any 
information their reporters find news worthy said they do not have such freedom. “We first of all 
think of what would be its impact to the Rwandan society that was made fragile by the 1994 
Genocide. We also think of what would be the reaction of the authorities considered the nature of 
the regime in place (somehow authoritarian). So, we always do self-censorship,” (Respondent 5, 
News Editor of a Local popular radio in Kigali).  
R6 discloses they are limited and always censored by government authorities. He recalls the 
time when they recorded a voice clip of a Rwandan living in Diaspora from one of the 
international radio stations that air in Kirundi and Kinyarwanda and used the same clip in their 
show on their local radio station. The interview in question was about a controversial bill of law 
and the interviewee was criticizing it. Abstaining to disclose that law to the researcher, he says 
they were surprised to hear that some authorities were not happy with what they did and yet 
interviewers had given the space to MINIJUST (Ministry of Justice) to respond to that interview. 
“We wondered why they were angry against us whereas they did not say anything about the 
primary source (The International radio station)” says R5. 
R6, with 5 years as a reporter and 2 years as a newspaper chief editor, discloses that there are 
some types of hidden censorship. And the latter constitute a big obstacle for journalistic 
principles of objectivity and completeness of information.  He, for example, says that after the 
1994 bloodshed events some words turned to be unacceptable in their reporting. “Some sources 
tend to think that any media practitioner is the same as the media of that time, and thus, in most 
cases you end up missing important information,” he says referring to the 1994 Genocide against 
Tutsi.  
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All respondents say that this self-censorship mainly goes to private media which voices 
issues of public concern while the pro-government media such as RBA and its branches are the 
government public relations tools and consequently preaching the regime’s ideology.  R7 regrets 
of being in the career of journalism due to complexities in this profession.  
“Being a journalist in Rwanda is like being in hot water, some genocide survivors look at 
media as betrayers and genocide perpetrators while killers consider that media are 
controlled by and part of the government, so journalists who did not play any role in the 
genocide get victimized and stay shy and censor themselves,” he revealed to the research. 
 
The same respondent says the government has been successful in silencing people and 
the country is far from having vibrant voices. “When you write something the government does 
not like, it says ‘genocide ideology’, ‘divisionism’, ‘incite people to hate leaders of the country’, 
etc and you get arrested and taken into courts because of that,” complains R7. He also complains 
about the government’s excessive control over the media stating that the small marketshare, the 
government’s sensitivity and the lack of professional journalists explain the low number of 
private newspapers and their fiasco. Along with a number of other respondents R7 criticizes the 
journalists’ limited access to information when they are investigating corruption or security 
matters. 
In contrast, R6 views that there is a government censorship on local media while 
international media are free to publish/air any information their reporters find news worthy, some 
international media claim there is an over government censorship. While international radios that 
have correspondents in Rwanda are estimated to have a very big audience they claim that their 
stories are often negatively commented and defied by the government. “This is a regular 
occurrence and expresses the government’s over control on what we do. It’s stressful,” says a 
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BBC correspondent who reveals he often receives phone calls from individuals in the 
government threatening him when he reports on sensitive issues. 
This respondent reveals the authorities are always informed on journalists’ movements. 
According to him, one must call them before broadcasting to inform on the subject and give 
them a chance to make their point. “When they are displeased, they give you a warning note, and 
after three warnings, an expatriate correspondent has to leave the country”, he testifies. The 
researcher also met a guest-teacher who is critically skeptical at students’ abstention on sensitive 
issues. “It might be hard teaching them the course regarding Opinion journalism,” confessed the 
teacher saying that journalism studies need openness of the mind and a baggage of critical 
thinking. The latter connects this to irresponsible media during the 1994 genocide with 
skepticism that “Rwandans do not yet know which lessons are to be learnt from the genocide.” 
IV. 2. Censorship and media coverage 
            In an effort to create a more political space and allow the citizens to freely express 
themselves, the Government of Rwanda undertook the reforms in laws. According to the 
Rwanda Governing Board (RGB) (2014), the Media law was revised specifically to create an 
enabling environment for a free press to thrive and also to attract both local and foreign 
investment within the media sector, while new laws were enacted to give journalists a greater say 
in regulating themselves and have easy access to information. RGB states that those important 
reforms and some of which are still underway to have been warmly acclaimed by media 
practitioners and stakeholders during the April 3rd, 2014 consultative media dialogue that aimed 
at assessing the implementation progress of media reforms. 
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However, some Rwandan journalists accuse the Prime Minister’s decrees which followed 
the promulgation of the Access to Information Law, of violating the freedom of press and speech 
freedom. R8, a journalist at a local radio operating in Kigali says that despite the good intention 
of the Access to Information Law, those decrees by the Prime Minister may constitute a barrier 
to information offering. 
While talking about the ministerial orders of October 9th, 2013 determining which 
information could destabilize the national security and procedures on charging fees concerning  
access to information, the limit for the provision of information or explanation and private 
organs to which the law relating to access to information applies, R8 says that “ Secret 
information is classified into four categories, meaning that a journalist cannot get access to such 
information, and they all have a common point; national security. However, from the early 
beginning of journalism in Rwanda, harmful information for the national security has never been 
documented so that journalists can be aware.” 
 
                                           
    
According to R8, before, secret information was that regarding military operations, arms, 
wars, intelligence and information in relation with the president. Nonetheless, instead of cutting 
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down the list, it has been enlarged to the extent that any leader can decide whether to give 
information or to keep it secret.  In fact, the law regarding information that can be harmful to the 
national security defines the national security as “ protection of State sovereignity, foreign 
relations and State interets, economy and national leadership, from any danger from within the 
country or out of the the country.” 
This decree defines secret information as information that can severely endanger national 
security once published. Secret information also, according to the law, means state secrets.  R9, a 
journalist of Grand Lack Hebdo, a local weekly paper, accuses the institutions in charge of media 
regulation of keeping silent about those violations of press freedom and speech freedom and 
threatens to take the case to courts if nothing is done. “Talking about secret information, they 
mix up spying with normal information,” claims R9. He wonders why it could be considered 
spying if a journalist gets information in advance that there will be promotion in ranks in military 
and publishes that information. According to him, in this situation, investigative journalism is 
hardly possible. 
R21, a high profile military officer working in the office of the President of Rwanda, in 
the same context for example, while in a consultative meeting in the Western Rwanda-Rubavu, 
which gathered RGB, local authorities and journalists, also accused journalists who criticize the 
government of working for the “enemy.” He said that criticizing the government is encouraging 
and supporting people who want to overthrow the government. “We will not tolerate such 
journalists,” he said. 
Another issue respondents identified with this decree is that it suggests punishments on 
the basis of criminal law to any individual who will have access to state secrets. Laws suggest 
that, journalists who may commit crimes that are considered as betraying or spying the country 
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should be punished under the article 449 of the criminal law.  The law reserves to any person 
found guilty of divulging state secrets during the war period, a punishment ranging from 20 years 
to 25 years of imprisonment and a punishment ranging from 10 years to 15 years of 
imprisonment in the period of the country’s tranquility. 
However, some journalists acknowledge the effort of the government to allow journalists 
access to information despite the bad will of some individuals in the government. “In general the 
government is willing to promote access to information. However there are some individuals in 
the government whose behavior should change,” says R10, a journalist of the East African, a 
regional paper, pointing to government officials who hardly deliver newsworthy information. 
R10 suggests to journalists to probe while covering their stories, but in line with the Access to 
Information Law and then criticize the decrees and the laws after having tried them. “There is 
nothing to accuse the law as there is no journalist who has already been tried under this law so 
far.” 
IV.3. Weaknesses in Rwanda journalism 
Despite the mutual accusation between media and the government as the restriction of press 
freedom and speech freedom, media experts depict some weaknesses both professionally and 
financially that may lead journalists in Rwanda to dodging journalism principles. R11, a media 
expert also in the Media Dialogue Meeting, says that some of the media managers do not have 
required knowledge and their media are easily manipulated.  “They easily get moved away in the 
direction of propagandists.” 
Another reason that R6 identifies is the financial constraints. She says that a number of 
journalists in Rwanda are poor and unethical. Such journalists cannot be independent and 
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impartial because they get bribed to write or broadcast one sided stories. This lack of integrity 
and devotion of one’s career lead to conflicts in most cases as most of the respondents pointed 
out. Respondents say that such behavior may sometimes lead to hate information as it has been 
the case for hate media in 1994 Genocide against Tutsi. 
Mutangana Steven, a media expert working for Institut Panos Paris, also brings in the case of 
some journalists who mix up their own beliefs and the professional reporting. According to 
Mutangana who also was a participant in the media dialogue, home based emotions and beliefs 
are against professional principles. “Writing down or broadcasting such emotions and beliefs that 
can be sometimes negative and harmful to the same extent as those who sowed hatred through 
journalism in 1994 Genocide.”  
In fact, all views surround the manipulation of journalists and media by politicians. Even 
though this cannot be an excuse on the side of media, this is a shared responsibility media should 
not be undergoing alone. It is clear there has been hate media that played a crucial role in the 
Genocide against Tutsi, but the government should not be under-looking its share in fueling hate 
media; which went against its responsibility to protect citizens. Before being a failure of media 
and journalists, the 1994 Genocide was a failure of the government and politicians. According to 
Muvunyi, the Leader of Rwanda Media Commission (RMC), for those who say that Rwanda 
does not grant press freedom because of the negative experience of hate media during the 
genocide, they should remember Rwanda is rebuilding in all sectors, so is journalism. “Media 
did not perpetrate the genocide more than the government. However, the government is still in 
existence and operating freely. So media should not be a scapegoat and be denied the rights”, he 
said. 
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IV.4. Relationship between the Genocidal Government and 
Hate Media 
On the question regarding the relationship between the genocidal government and hate 
media during the genocide and in the pre-genocide period, of 23 respondents who agreed to 
answer this question, 20 point out that media were either pro-government or extremists working 
on the side of the government but with  very radical behavior against Tutsi. R12, a journalist 
trained by Pax Press, a local human rights organization and press agency at the same time, gives 
an example of RTLM, Radio Télevision Libre des Milles Collines, considered like the 
mastermind of hate media in the Genocide against Tutsi. 
He reminds that almost all share holders of RTLM were government officials or 
cornerstone of MRND (Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement), the 
ruling party whose’ “Interahamwe,” militias executed the genocide. Three of the respondents, 
however, insisted that it was a responsibility of journalists to respect journalism principles and 
refuse to be used by genocide perpetrators. These respondents, therefore, argue that media have 
to pay their role in the perpetration of the genocide to prevent current and future journalists from 
repeating the same fatal errors. 
Among advocates of media, R13 recalls the speeches of Habyarimana Juvénal, President 
of Rwanda before the genocide, before each news edition of Radio Rwanda-the only radio in 
Rwanda at that time. According to him, the speeches were full of propaganda messages and 
sometimes hate messages against Tutsi. He concludes that there was no way media could publish 
or air hate messages if it was not by the will of the government. “Government officials should be 
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accountable and protect their people from any harm. They should not run away from their 
responsibilities.”  
Similarly, R14 confers there was a strong relationship between the genocidal government 
and hate media arguing that if it was not the case, the government would have stopped them from 
catalyzing the hatred between Hutus and Tutsis. “In my opinion, there was. If there was no such 
a relationship, the then government would have closed them (hate media). Why were those 
media publishing/airing the hate speeches of the then authorities?,” wonders R5, one of the most 
popular journalists in Kigali because of his critical and engaging radio programs. This viewpoint 
is shared by almost 90% of the respondents. 
R10 emphasizes that in a number of cases some genocide convicts were reported to be 
founder members of hate media like Radio Télevision Libre des Milles Collines that was branded 
the incendiary radio. Moreover, according to him, most of hate media were directly linked to 
political parties. Those include Umurwanashyaka. Others, like Kangura were pro, or just owned 
by the ruling party, MRND whose members prepared and executed the Genocide.  R5, however, 
believes hate media could not have perpetrated the genocide alone. He says “They were just a 
tool of the government; otherwise a genocide is planned and executed by a government. If the 
government was not behind, we would have heard of some media outlets being shut down.” 
Contrary to R5, R6 believes that even without the government support, hate media could 
have encouraged and perpetrated the genocide. She says that hate media largely contributed to 
calling upon the inhabitants to kill their neighbors, and used to update them on the war that was 
opposing the government of Rwanda to the Rwanda patriotic front. “They were warning the 
community, the Hutu especially, that they will perish in case the Tutsi are not exterminated,” she 
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says. She adds that they could do it via speeches, meeting that were rebroadcasted, or even 
through songs of the infamous Simon Bikindi and others.  
IV.5. Repercussions of hate media on today’s Rwandan 
media 
15 out of 15 respondents who answered the question regarding whether the experience of 
hate media had consequences on press freedom and speech freedom confirm that consequences 
of the hate media are obvious and tangible on the current Rwandan media, particularly private 
media. R10 states there have been cases where the government categorized some local 
independent media in the range of hate media. Among those cases, the respondent along with a 
number of other respondents mentioned Umuseso and Umuvugizi, local papers that have been 
ordered to permanently close. “Independent media houses mainly those that try to criticize the 
current regime are sometimes compared to RTLM and Kangura Newspaper. Thus, many media 
houses fear to negatively write about the government even when they have tangible facts,” 
reveals R5. 
Apart from temporary or permanent closure of media houses suspected of spreading hate 
messages, respondents also pointed out some cases of imprisonment of journalists, cases of 
murders and some cases of journalists who fled the country due to  their stories that have been 
qualified hatred catalyzes. R15, both a journalist and human rights activist, recalls the murder of 
Jean Léonard Rugambage, a journalist for Umuvugizi Newspaper, who was assassinated few 
weeks before the 2010 presidential elections trying to investigate the murder of a dissident 
Rwandan General, Kayumba Nyamwasa. He also gave a long list of journalists including Charles 
Kabonero, Chief Editor of Umuseso; Jean Bosco Gasasira, Chief Editor of Umuvugizi, Nelson 
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Gatsimbazi, owner of Umusingi Newspaper, etc who fled the country due to threats by the 
government because of their editorial lines criticizing government officials. For the cases of 
imprisonment he mentioned the example of Agnes Uwimana owner and Chief Editor of 
Umurabyo Newspaper and Saidate Mukakibibi, a journalist of Umurabyo Newspaper who were 
put in jail because of their stories that criticized the president and that were proven divisionism 
motivated, by local courts. 
Besides physical punishment and threats from the government, respondents find difficult 
to do journalism in Rwanda after its implication in the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi. R20 says, 
for instance, that media did not commit the genocide but some of them helped in spreading the 
genocide ideology, which consequently helped in preparing and speeding up its perpetration. For 
that reason, Rwandans no longer trust any media. R19, in this regard, says it is important for the 
GoR to acknowledge that media’s roles in the Genocide against Tutsi were due to the fact that 
they were serving the government and certain individuals of influence instead of serving the 
Rwandans’ interests. The latter says the current GoR should back up the role media plays in the 
reconstruction of Rwanda and in the unity and reconciliation of Rwandans and initiate media 
literacy to help media regain people’s trust. 
IV.6. Lessons learnt by the current Government of Rwanda 
from the relationship between hate media and the genocidal 
government 
All respondents approached by the researcher did acknowledge Rwanda media played a 
significant role in the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi. However, the researcher’s curiosity pushed 
him to ask them if the genocide could not have taken place if there were no hate media. 
117	  
	  
Surprisingly, 14 out 15 who agreed to answer this question said, no matter what, the genocide 
could have taken place.  “Because there were many other channels to teach hate between Tutsi 
and Hutu such as parents-children conversations around the fire place,” replied R5 also invoking 
history course materials that contained hate messages. 
The researcher pushed further to delve deep into the role of media in the Genocide 
against Tutsi and asked whether hate media could have perpetrated the genocide alone and all 
respondents said there was no way this could happen without the governments’ influence. 
“Impossible because media do not use machetes or guns,” one of the respondents said.  
Nonetheless, a number of respondents doubt whether the current GoR might have taken a lesson 
from the relationship between the genocidal government and hate media. “My answer is “ it 
somehow could” because, even if the Government has jailed some journalists who were accused 
of denying the genocide or spreading the double genocide theory, there are some other media 
(government sponsored ones) that publish hate messages,” says R14 who however says such hate 
messages are conveyed in the opposite direction. “But for how long will things go up side 
down?,” wonder respondents who also say enough is enough Rwandans need a rest. “We need 
harmony and live in peace,” said R14, a journalist trained by Pax Press. 
Despite those who despise the lesson the GoR might have taken from sad experiences of 
the relationship between the genocidal government and hate media, R6 identifies such a lesson in 
the government’s behavior. “The government is conscientious because it supported media 
regulations, media law and other legal framework that prevent journalists from abusing the 
profession.” He mentions other laws including the Genocide Ideology Law stating that they help 
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the whole community and they are at the same time favorable to the media, because they help to 
keep away from bad practice and thinking, as far as reporting is concerned.  
Those who acknowledge the GoR learnt a lesson from such a negative solidarity between 
hate media and the genocidal government state that that is the reason why the Rwanda Media 
Commission (RMC) which serves as the gatekeeper of the profession has been established. The 
latter makes sure there are no such big mistakes that would again send the country into chaos. 
RMC is an institution run by journalists themselves and has the responsibility to watch the 
respect of journalism principles and to protect individuals’ rights. However, among the managing 
team of this organization that is also in charge of watching people’s common interests, there are 
also representatives of the civil society, lawyers, academicians, government officials, and media 
managers. 
Fred Muvunyi, Chairman of RMC, says that including other sectors in this media self 
regulatory institution is to insure not only the journalists get their due protection but also the 
public stay safe from some journalism abuses. In fact RMC mediate the general public with 
journalists protecting each side in case of the abuse of laws. Though RMC helps journalists to 
get justice in case of persecution, a big eye is put on media to avoid any kind of malpractice that 
may occur. 
IV.7. Building Media and Journalists’ Capacity would 
Bridge National Security and Speech Freedom 
Despite cases of violation of press freedom and speech freedom in the name of state 
sovereignty and national security, media experts and human rights activists still say there is hope 
for the future of journalism in Rwanda. Didace Niyifasha, Programs Director at Inkoramutima 
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Radio, says there are young media professionals and practitioners who really show the devotion 
for the career and believes these young people could draw a lesson from the mixture of the 
negative experience of hate media and the harassments by current authorities inasmuch as they 
are protecting the society from the recidivism of the hardship of the 1994 Genocide, and come up 
with a strong and reunited journalism that serves better the public. 
Media experts and practitioners confess that by building the capacity of the journalists 
and media houses and making its population media literate, Rwanda could secure its national 
security and still respect press freedom and speech freedom. “Once the ordinary citizen is able to 
discern or criticize what he hears on radio or watches on TV or read in the newspaper and have a 
chance to debate about it with others there will be no room for rumors, the truth will prevail and 
the security will be assured,”  argues R5. 
The latter also suggests there should be professional trainings for journalists believing 
that “Journalists who are well educated, who know journalism-ethics and who are conscious of 
their social responsibility are not easy to manipulate. Journalists should also learn conflict 
reporting. It will prevent them from being manipulated”. According to R 20, a journalist and 
human rights activists, reliable journalism will lead citizens to active choices and take well-
informed decisions and thus avoid or solve a conflict. He, however, sees an improvement in the 
recent change of the journalism schools’ curriculum to better answer the needs of a country 
emerging from the aftermath of the genocide where media played a crucial role. 
As mentioned above, financial means are among the core barriers of free and independent 
media in Rwanda. Nonetheless, for having a well-organized profession there is need for more 
independence towards authorities. While R20 maintains that a professional organization might 
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also help journalists to get better salaries and working-conditions so that they are not so easily 
attracted by doubtful propositions, private media houses lack due financial support. The latter 
states that while media live on advertisements and announcements, the GoR do not give them 
adverts and announcements. Only government and pro-government media get advertizing money 
from the government. 
The Executive Secretary of the Media High Council (MHC), Peacemaker 
Mbugiramihigo, in a consultative meeting with journalists and local government officials on the 
enforcement of the Access to Information Law, asserted that building media capacity and 
training journalists for a developed and responsible journalism is part of MHC objectives. The 
MHC has been established almost 11 years ago with aim of promoting journalism, granting 
media licenses and press cards and media monitoring. Last elaborated last year, the Access to 
Information Law reduces the power of this institution leaving it with the responsibility of 
advocacy aiming at building media capacity and journalists’ professional skills. Other 
responsibilities were given to the Rwanda Media Commission RMC and RURA (Rwanda Utility 
Regulatory Agency).  
Mbugiramihigo says the responsibilities the MHC was assigned are achieved through 
research that identifies the hindrances and gaps that need to be filled and find solutions to meet 
them. He says one of the crucial problems in media in Rwanda is reporting that does not respect 
journalism principles. “Journalists do not report facts and in so doing they don’t serve the 
community because sometimes they give incomplete information or divert journalism 
principles,” he said alarming such kind of reporting cannot serve the public. He however says 
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that together with other institutions in charge of media, they are working hard to solve this 
problem so that journalists could meet their different publics’ needs. 
The MHC Boss, further, mentioned that they resolved to keep carrying media needs 
assessments so that they can base on Rwanda journalism’s needs to train journalists and equip 
them with knowledge that is relevant to the people they are serving (Rwandans). He also said 
they identified weaknesses in some media management stating that some media houses do not 
have policies that can help them earn their living. “If a media is not making profits it cannot 
respond to all principles of journalism," he said. According to him this resides in most cases 
from poor education of media managers who scarcely draw the institutions’ policies with clear 
and fair working conditions. 
Despite all these irregularities in media in Rwanda, media have been summoned into the 
equation to play a bigger role in fostering greater understanding of the development challenges 
the country faces. According to Thomas Kagera (2014), the Government and partners are 
committed to developing the media, especially in the area of liberalization, which has seen the 
establishment of nearly 30 radio stations in less than a decade, over 50 print media houses and 5 
TV stations (with about 11 other applications being processed by RURA). The radios are 
predominantly private with some that are community-based. The one radio station and one TV 
that belonged to the government (Radio Rwanda and Rwanda Television) were turned into a 
public entity under the Rwanda Broadcasting Agency (RBA). 
For media to potentially serve their purpose to the public, they need to be equipped and 
empowered to question more objectively and engage more actively with citizens to increase 
public awareness, promote good governance practices and encourage engagement with politics 
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and development initiatives. However, this requires the government to consider media’s social 
responsibility instead of looking at them in the mirror of the tragic event of 1994 Genocide 
against Tutsi. And as stated above, media should be viewed as partners in development and unity 
and reconciliation and hence be equipped to promote debates among Rwandans regarding topics 
of the public interest. 
 
IV.8. Lack of freedom of speech as promotion of other 
channels spreading hate messages 
A number of respondents find it erroneous for the GoR to use the role of hate media in 
the Genocide against Tutsi to hinder people from express themselves freely. Some of the 
respondents say it would be better to let people say what they think so as to know how to 
strategically face hate messages that are still embedded in the society. R14 brings in cases of 
serial murders that are taking place in Rwanda 20 years after the genocide and draws a 
connection with the libido due to little space for people to express. “They keep it in their minds 
and when it explodes it causes more damages that could have been avoided if we let them 
express and then face them with strong behavior change messages,” he said. 
According to R10, expressing oneself freely does not mean spreading hate messages. 
“Those who will abuse that freedom of expression will face justice,” he cautions that restricting 
freedom of expression does not obstruct other channels that hate messages are conveyed through 
such us conversations between parents and their children in their resting rooms. He further says 
that these kinds of channels are very dangerous when there is no open debate in media. For him, 
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open debates in media can counteract negative and misleading information children have from 
their parents.    
For the question in regard with whether the GoR could secure its national security without 
severely restricting the right to free speech and press freedom, 15 out of 15 respondents who 
answered this question found it possible.  
Yes, it could. We agree it was hard, given the tension that was created by the Genocide. Still, 
the government could enforce more and more the reconciliation debates, thus persuading the 
community to being united, without using restrictions. The legal framework could also give 
people the right to speech and press freedom, while also providing serious punishment in 
case of failure to comply, says R19.   
The same respondent cautions the government that people should be given the space to 
express themselves freely because the community now has what it takes to be reunited. "People 
are just concerned about their development, not their differences”, he warns. According to him, 
as far as there is a legal framework which does not allow divisionism, there should be freedom of 
expression, and the law would deal with those who do not comply with laws. 
R5’s conviction is that expressing oneself freely does not mean spreading hate messages. 
According to him, the government should let people express themselves and deal with those who 
will abuse that freedom of expression. “Those who will abuse speech freedom will face justice,” 
he says claiming that restricting freedom of expression does not obstruct other channels through 
which hate messages are conveyed such us conversations between parents and their children in 
their resting rooms. He, in addition, judges such channels as very dangerous cautioning that open 
debates in media could counteract fall information children get from their parents.   
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IV.9. Attitudes and behavior of consumers of rights 
“If You Can’t Beat Them, Blog Them,” (Brenda Bukowa, 2012:1). 
Due to the fear to express themselves fearing heavy punishments instilled  in laws 
regarding the genocide ideology and the genocide negation there are up risings of social 
networks both individual and forums where Rwandans in Rwanda and in Diaspora share about 
topics viewed as taboo in Rwanda. Those forums and social networks pages including blogs 
carry in many cases fake names so that their users and subscribers may not be identified by the 
government.  
One of the typical examples of such pages is “Friends of Reason,” a facebook page where 
dissidents of the regime including famous Rwandan journalists such as Didas Gasana, Charles 
Kabonero, etc and pros meet to debate crucial issues that cannot be discussed in open air in 
Rwanda. While ‘top dogs’ of the page identify themselves in their own names, a number of 
members of the page use pseudonyms to get rid of repercussions of the content of the page as 
more than 75% of posts are black critics against the current GoR. 
According to Freedom House (2014), the expansion of internet access has enabled the 
Rwandan blogosphere to evolve into a vibrant platform for expression, even though the websites 
and blogs of opposition activists both within and outside Rwanda are inconsistently available. 
While opposition supporters living outside Rwanda, mainly in Europe and the United States, are 
responsible for most of the criticism against the government on forums, websites, and blogs, 
local dissenting voices are increasingly heard in online news portals such as Igihe mainly in 
readers’ comments. 
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Freedom House reveals that Twitter has also offered Rwandans a new platform for 
protest. For example, citizens flocked to Twitter in 2012 to reject a decision by the Kigali City 
Council to close a local entertainment venue, (Ssenyonga, 2012). He also narrates another 
instance where Rwandans came together on Twitter to denounce a controversial United Nations 
report on Rwanda’s involvement in the conflict taking place in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Steve Doughty (2012) also gives an example with which citizens also used the social 
media platform to circulate a petition against the United Kingdom’s cuts in development aid that 
came in response to the UN report’s findings.  
David Kabuye (2012), however, says the extent to which the media should have the 
unchecked right to free expression is often a matter of public debate in Rwanda. He says some 
commentators suggest that Rwanda’s media practitioners should be cautious in their speech as 
long as the history of genocide continues to haunt the country. While Rwandan journalists are 
called to pay attention to their language so that they don’t fall into the trap of being accused of 
the genocide ideology, a number of respondents all journalists and human rights activists claim 
that the genocide ideology should not be punished under criminal laws. 
While two decades ago there was only one state-owned television station , Rwanda now 
has four television stations and two pay TV channels. Eleven new television stations are waiting 
to be granted licenses and will be on air soon. There are over 29 FM radio stations, from only 
one in 1994 (after the closure of hate radio RTLM). From five newspapers 20 years ago, there 
are now over 50 registered newspapers. 
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IV.10. Conclusion 
The experience of hate media in the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi continues to spark 
Rwanda media. While the whole Rwandan public watches media with a critical eye, the GoR has 
created a wall of laws to safeguard the society against irregularities in media products that may 
lag Rwandans unity and reconciliation and take the country to such a hardship event again. Of 
those laws, the research mentions the Genocide Ideology Law, the Genocide Negation Law and 
media related laws.  
Many institutions such as CNLG (Commission National de Lutte Contre le Genocide), 
Media High Counsel (MHC), Rwanda Media Commission (RMC), etc have been put in place to 
work hand in hand with the government and the judiciary to watch the enforcement of these 
laws. Nonetheless, given the vagueness of these laws and the lack of clear definitions and 
limitations of terminologies in the laws such as genocide ideology, genocide denial, etc critics 
accuse the GoR of manipulating them to silence any dissident. Human Rights activists, 
journalists, opposition parties and some ordinary citizens also view it in a sense that they hinder 
people from expressing themselves while the freedom of speech is a fundamental human right. 
According to the former Prime Minister of Rwanda who was still on duty during my 
research, Pierre Damien Habumuremyi, in an opening note of the Media Dialogue in April 2014, 
African media needs to come up with strong measures to curb hate media on the African 
continent as one of the strategies to ensure that the media are no longer used to fuel atrocities. 
The Prime said people should not confuse preventing hate speech with the violation of the 
freedom of speech insisting that was not the case with Rwanda trying to censor media. “Freedom 
of speech does not mean freedom of inciting hatred,” he said. 
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 He further revealed that in the case of Rwanda, the Constitution and related media laws 
acknowledge freedom of expression and the right to express one’s opinions, beliefs or ideas, as 
one of the core values of a democratic society, adding however, that there are other values that 
have to be protected by society and the law. He, therefore, cautions that one’s freedom of 
expression, whether online or through mainstream media, may not be allowed when it 
contains hate speech. 
               I do support his stand that the value of free expression of opinions and beliefs in society 
has to be weighed in accordance with people’s right to dignity, respect and integrity. Considering 
the role of journalists in nation building, “each journalist must contribute towards the stability of 
their country and play a role in fighting whoever may attempt to destabilize its security” also 
evoked the Prime. While everybody would go along with this, the core question may still revolve 
around knowing exactly what is that stability/security he meant? How and when could they be 
allowed to interfere with personal lives? And how could one enjoy his freedom of speech in an 
environment where it is unsafe to discuss about some topics, even topics of the common interests 
though sensitive. 
 It is obvious and out of discussion that all citizens, including journalists, need a secure 
environment to peacefully carry out their duties and responsibilities. However, given the role of 
journalism which is to inform, educate and entertain,   journalists play an important role in the 
enlightenment and development of the society.  Since journalists have the mandate to advocate 
for the social welfare of the society, hindering them from doing their job would sound like hiding 
some important issues from the general public, which consequently lags the latter behind. 
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Research findings have also confirmed the role of hate media in the 1994 Genocide against 
Tutsi. They however claim that before it became the role of media, it was the government one’s 
because the genocide happened in a country with a sovereign government. Research findings 
also accuse the government of that time of having manipulated media and used them for an 
incendiary purpose. In addition, respondents say that the role of the pre-genocide government in 
the Genocide against Tutsi did not prevent the country from having a government which stands 
as a government and successfully executes its duties. For that reason, they prove that media 
should be given freedom and in case of interference in people’s private issues aiming at sowing 
hatred, then laws can apply. 
However, they denounce individuals in the government who censor media to hide their 
irresponsibility in the government services. Critics from respondents also put it that government 
officials who silence media and public opinions are those who are afraid of being held 
accountable for their malpractices. They therefore claim that political leaders have to open the 
space for free speech and for criticizing any point of view without any distinction.  
Respondents also demand the government to establish a guarantee fund to allow media to 
become self reliant. This comes from the points of view of a number of respondents who claimed 
that most of media are poor and without financial independence, they easily get manipulated by 
those who give them money to function. This comes in the time Rwanda is believed to be well 
progressing in all sectors including economic development, education, health, gender, etc and yet 
Rwanda media still claim to have been lagged behind. 
Respondents also think that by allowing people to freely express themselves, the government 
could find a way to identify those with destructive ideas and tackle them strategically with 
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behavior change communications. They assume that some hate messages cannot miss to appear 
only 20 years after the genocide because of its setback, but argue that hindering community 
debates and individual freedom of speech could make things worse. “If you inhibit inner crucial 
messages, they may sometimes explode and cause more damages,” said one of the respondents. 
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GENERAL	  CONCLUSIONS	  AND	  RECOMMENDATIONS	  
 
1. Conclusions 
	  
This thesis aimed at studying the role of hate media in the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi 
and their impact on human rights in Rwanda today with emphasis on freedom of speech and 
press freedom. Greater emphasis was put on RTLM and Kangura to see how the role of these 
divisionism-motivated media affects media operations in Rwanda today. The research also aimed 
at verifying whether their editorial lines were due to the excess of press freedom and free speech 
or whether they were politically motivated and manipulated to help readers to understand the 
extent to which the freedom of speech should be limited in a post conflict environment and that 
to which the restriction of media freedom should affect the individuals’ free speech. 
The study drew a correlation between hate media and the genocidal leadership aiming at 
appraising whether the genocide could have taken place if there was no partnership between 
media and the government. It has also discussed issues of speech freedom and democracy and 
the impact of freedom of speech and press freedom to unity and reconciliation in Rwanda. Given 
the double standard role of media in destroying and rebuilding Rwanda, the study also looked at 
the relationship between the current GoR and media so as to see if the same errors as in the 1994 
hardship event may not reoccur.  
The main objective of this study was to analyze the consequences of the genocide and 
hate media on human rights in Rwanda, especially freedom of speech and press freedom. The 
study, therefore, analyzed the role of media in the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda with 
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emphasis on hate media. It also made an assessment of different steps media in Rwanda have 
undertaken to avoid the recidivism of fatal errors committed by their fellow pioneers. It has also 
had a look at the relationship between human security and freedom of speech and the 
relationship between governance and free speech and press freedom with intent to recommend 
the GoR on how to regulate media without necessarily imposing restrictions on free speech.  
The research confirms an absolute truth of the participation of Rwanda media such as 
Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) also portrayed as “incendiary radio”, 
Rwanda National Radio and some print media like Kangura, in mobilizing the Hutu to kill all 
Tutsi and moderate Hutu who were considered as traitors.  Respondents also confirm the role of 
some individual journalists like Habimana Kantano of RTLM, Ngeze Hassan who was the Chief 
Editor of Kangura, Bemeriki Valery, Georges Ruggiu, a Beligian who was working closely with 
RTLM, etc in spreading hate messages encouraging the Hutu to kill their compatriots Tutsi and 
moderates Hutu. 
As a result of this hate propaganda, Rwanda lost more than one million Tutsi and 
moderate Hutu in only one hundred days. This negative experience proves that despite the fact 
that freedom of expression is one of the essential foundations of democracy and it is important 
for the development and protection of other human rights, it is also a double-edge sword. 
Researchers, scholars and human rights activists do all concur as proved in this study that 
freedom of speech and press freedom remain freedoms only when they do not interfere with the 
personal space of some other individuals. In other words, they remain freedoms when they do 
not violate other people’s rights. 
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As media can bring to a positive or negative impact depending on their usage, their power 
carries a heavy responsibility; social responsibility as well. Experiences in this study have proven 
at the one hand that whatever is portrayed in media regarding any issue, immediately gains an 
excitement and leaves a deep impact on the minds of many people. That is why some laws had to 
be laid down to keep a proper check. However, research findings have revealed a controversial 
implication of media in fueling conflicts. While some respondents pointed at government 
officials to purposely manipulate media to use them as propaganda tools, others criticize 
journalists for ignoring journalism principles to serve the interests of some individuals, thus 
taking part in the conflict. 
 Nonetheless, Reporters without Borders (1995) claim that the main reforms needed to 
prevent genocide or other gross abuses of human rights lie outside the sphere of the media. They 
include: reform of the security forces to make them impartial and accountable; ending the culture 
of impunity by holding perpetrators to account for human rights violations; establishing an 
independent and impartial Judiciary; developing a culture and institutions of popular democratic 
participation (Reporters without Borders, 1995). To them, the media can assist in this process by 
exposing wrongdoing by state agents -in particular covert manipulation of ethnic grievances by 
government agents. 
2. Key findings 
The literature compiled from books, reports of human rights organizations and media 
stories led the research to confirm a leading role of hate media in perpetrating the Genocide 
against Tutsi. Media like RTLM, Radio Rwanda and Kangura did incite the Hutu to kill their 
compatriots Tutsi and moderate Hutu. While radios were using captivating music to attract 
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Rwanda youth in villages to listen and get access to them and incite them to kill, newspapers did 
the same with strong divisionism-oriented messages and sophisticated cartoons portraying the 
Tutsi as non humans.  
Nonetheless, both the literature and the field study do not go along with the stand of the 
government to over control media and individuals’ freedom of speech. They bring in an 
unprecedented role of the government in inducing media to incite the Hutu to kill the Tutsi 
before and during the 1994 Genocide.  Therefore, they both remind the government that the 
genocide was a shared responsibility between media and the government and, ipso facto, 
hindering press freedom and speech freedom could sound like a run-away from their 
responsibility on the side of the government.  
Due to the role media are accused of in the Genocide against Tutsi, journalists always are 
very careful to express themselves so as not to use some words that may hurt some healing 
wounds or to sound trivializing or denying the Genocide against Tutsi. Because of the language 
manipulation during the genocide and conflict events among political parties after the genocide, 
a number of words such as “Interahamwe” (people of the same expedition), “Impuzamugambi” 
(people with the same goal), “Ubuyanja” (raise from weakness), etc have been eliminated from 
Kinyarwanda‒the native language of all Rwandans. Using such words or related sayings could 
subject one on heavy punishment indicated in the genocide ideology law.  This also restricts the 
free expression as by using them one may find himself accused of the genocide ideology or 
divisionism.  
Criticizing the government also is a crime punished by Rwanda laws. Some journalists such 
as Agnes Uwimana, Saidate Mukakibibi, Charles Kabonero, etc have been incriminated of 
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inciting people to hate the leadership. Moreover, media that dare to criticize the current regime 
are sometimes compared to RTLM and Kangura Newspaper. Thus, many media houses fear to 
negatively write about the government even when they have tangible facts. Examples are 
Umuseso and Umuvugizi Newspapers that have been permanently closed because of their critics 
against the government. 
Research findings have revealed a strong relationship between hate media and the genocidal 
government (Government of Rwanda 1990 1994 insisting that if there was no such a 
relationship, the then government would have closed them (hate media). As a proof media were 
mainly publishing/airing hate speeches of the then authorities. Moreover, most of hate media 
belonged to government authorities very close to President Habyarimana and his wife. So the 
genocide could not have succeeded without such a partnership between hate media and the 
government.   
Another issue that hinders media from expressing and informing freely is the lack of 
financial means. As they are always dependent either on the government or private investors who 
want to make profits, journalists cannot be free to report anything they find news worthy. In fact, 
almost all news is one sided while according to a Nigerian author Chimamanda Adichie (2009), a 
single story is dangerous. 
So, building the capacity of the journalists and media houses along with making Rwandans 
media literate could improve the status of press freedom and speech freedom. When the ordinary 
citizen is able to discern or criticize what he listens to on radio or watches on TV or read in the 
newspaper and have a chance to debate about it with others there we will be no room for rumors, 
the truth will prevail and the security will be assured as believe the respondents.   
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A number of respondents caution that restricting freedom of expression does not obstruct 
other channels through which hate messages are conveyed such us parents-children 
conversations in their resting rooms. They believe open debates in media could counteract bad 
ideologies children fetch from their parents.  On the contrary, inhibiting critics may cause more 
harms than letting them out. A number of respondents cautioned that silenced views may 
sometimes explode at an unstoppable speed and advise to manage them when they can still be 
flexibly manipulated. 
Other research findings revealed that because of fearing heavy punishments that may 
emanate from free expression, most of Rwandans are turning their eyes to social media where 
they can post any view without any censorship. Through facebook pages such as Friends of 
Reason, Udukoryo, Ukuri kuravugwa, etc, twitter and blogs, Rwandans, especially young people, 
exchange views about social and political topics that are considered taboo in Rwanda. As the 
government do not have any possibility to stop such kind of communications, while the access to 
internet is overwhelmingly  increasing, the government encourages pro-government youth to 
face such negativist views via the same means, which at the end generate debates that are not 
allowed in an open air.   
Finally, the study has revealed that hate media perpetrated the genocide along with the 
totalitarian government that was controlled by a small group of Hutu extremists, who had also 
over control on the media. In fact, hate media such as RTLM and Kangura were financed and 
controlled by a small fraction of Hutu insiders within the government, called the Akazu. 
Consequently, hate media were politically motivated and served political ends instead of laying 
on journalism principles. So, in a democratic country where people are free to speak out their 
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minds and where journalists are allowed to be the voice of the voiceless, media cannot anchor 
the evil. Only an authoritarian government would impose media to ignore ordinary people’s 
views and take a one way direction enchanting the government, which at the end induces media 
in fatal errors such as the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi. 
3. Recommendations 
Most of the recommendations of this study are based on the suggestions given by 
respondents, the researcher’s observations and experience in the fields of journalism, peace and 
conflict studies as well as experiences from the study. These recommendations are geared 
towards improving the freedom of expression and press freedom and aim at securing human 
rights in Rwanda. After six months of a sleepless research, the researcher deems necessary to 
recommend the government of Rwanda on how to cooperate with media in building a more 
peaceful country that respects all human rights including freedom of speech and press freedom. 
Journalists, media houses and the general public of Rwanda are also recommended on how to 
enjoy their free speech without endangering other people’s rights. 
As the research proves a clear cooperation between the genocidal GoR and hate media in 
the Genocide against Tutsi, the current regime should consider that without the government’s 
support media cannot sow hatred and cannot therefore perpetrate the genocide. The government 
should guarantee the freedom of speech and press freedom as grants the constitution and watch 
media laws to make sure individuals’ rights are respected. 
It is difficult to eradicate hate speech if the society is built on hate. Yet, you cannot know 
where exactly hatred in the society is if people do not speak out their minds. The government 
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should allow all points of views and initiate the culture of debate where everybody will be taught 
to respect other people’s opinions. In that way, strong and constructive ideas will take the 
forefront to run the society and there will not  be any room for hate and incendiary speeches. 
People will learn to leave together in harmony and peace will prevail. 
The GoR should not keep a pessimistic eye on media, because despite a significant role 
media played in fueling the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi, they also took an outstanding 
responsibility in peace building and reconciliation. Having suffered from a negative experience 
of hate media, a number of Rwanda journalists opted for a different direction after the genocide 
summoning for practicing journalism for peace and development.   
Nonetheless, due to the lack of required journalistic knowledge and the lack of financial 
means for some media houses, some Rwandan journalists get bribed and report one sided stories. 
This gives a way through to injustice and conflicts. So the government should help in building 
media and journalists’ capacity to help media to think and work independently‒which will at the 
end lead to more responsible and objective media. 
Freedom of expression and press freedom can only be restricted to protect the rights and 
reputations of others or to protect national security, public order, public health or morals. 
However, experiences have proven restrictions in the name of public order and national security 
can often be excessively broad and vague. So, academics, human rights activists and media 
experts recommend that such restrictions should only be imposed where there is a real risk of 
harm to a legitimate interest meaning there is a significant risk of imminent harm; the expression 
was made with the intention of causing the harm. 
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 As indicated in previous parts, the genocide cannot take place without the support of 
the government. So, the international community should monitor "hate media" particularly when 
linked to government authorities, and restrictions on freedom of expression as an early warning 
of potential gross violations of human rights. Reporters without Boarders (1995) suggest this 
should be a greater responsiveness on the part of the UN Secretariat to warnings generated 
through other parts of the UN apparatus, notably the special mechanisms dealing with human 
rights.  
 In case of the government-supported conflicts as it has been the case during the 
Genocide against Tutsi, the international community should encourage and support radio stations 
and other media which promote peace, tolerance and public debates, whether from within the 
country or from outside in local languages. There should also be professional training for 
journalists in countries affected or endangered by ethnic conflict.  
Future	  Research	  
This study was focused on freedom of speech and press freedom in human security in 
Rwanda. It has demonstrated how the history of the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi continues to be 
a barrier to freedom of speech and press freedom, thus being an obstacle to unity and 
reconciliation as people are not free to lay down all the truth and find a way forward.  
Further research could assess speech freedom and Press freedom in human development 
or in development at large. There is a need also to carry a critical study on speech freedom in 
education either in Rwanda or any other country to see how speech freedom or the lack of the 
latter could facilitate or hamper knowledge sharing. Future research should also appraise citizen 
journalism in countries with limited speech freedom and press freedom. 
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APPENDIX	  
Questionnaire for Journalists 
This questionnaire is intended to collect data for the partial fulfillment of an MA Degree in 
International Master in Peace Conflict and Development Studies at Jaume I University, 
Castellon/Spain. The information you provide is confidential and very important in helping to 
appraise Speech Freedom and Press Freedom in Human Security in Rwanda.  Your answers are 
confidential and will be used only for the purpose of the research!  
Name………….(optional)                                                Age………. 
Profession……….                                                             Experience…… 
Nationality…….. 
NB: There is no limit you can provide as much information as you like. 
 
Questions 
6. Did the role of hate media in the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi have consequences on the 
way you express yourself? 
How?......................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................ 
II	  
	  
7. Did hate media have consequences on the freedom of speech and press freedom? Could 
you mention some?................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................... 
8. Was there any relationship between hate media and the genocidal government 
(Government of Rwanda 1990 1994)?...................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................... 
9. Could you describe such a relationship, if any?....................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
.............. 
10. Do you think the genocide could not have taken place if there were not any ‘hate media’? 
Why?......................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................... 
III	  
	  
11. Could hate media have perpetrated the genocide alone?.......................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
........... 
12. Did Rwanda media professionals and media practitioners learn any lesson from hate 
media? 
How?......................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................. 
13. Do you think the post genocide Government of Rwanda took a lesson from the 
relationship between the genocidal government and hate media?........................... 
Explain...................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
......................................................... 
14. Could the Rwanda Government secure its national security without severely restricting 
the right to free speech and press freedom? 
How?......................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
IV	  
	  
................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................... 
15. After the role of hate media in the Genocide against Tutsi, should the Government of 
Rwanda let people express themselves freely? 
Why?......................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................. 
                                                         Thank you for your participation! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V	  
	  
Questionnaire Human Rights Organizations and Human Rights Activists 
This questionnaire is intended to collect data for the partial fulfillment of an MA Degree in 
International Master in Peace, Conflict and Development Studies at Jaume I University, 
Castellon/Spain. The information you provide is confidential and very important in helping to 
appraise Speech Freedom and Press Freedom in Human Security in Rwanda.  Your answers are 
confidential and will be used only for the purpose of the research!  
Name………….(optional)                                                Age………. 
Profession……….                                                             Experience…… 
Nationality…….. 
Questions 
1. What is the quality of Rwanda media discovery of Human Rights?/Kuba itangazamakuru 
ryo mu Rwanda rizi uburenganzira bwa muntu byongera iki ku mikorere 
y’itangazamakuru?…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………….. 
2. What kind of news/information do media in Rwanda frequently cover? Why?/Ni ubuhe 
bwoko bw’amakuru ibitangazamakuru byo mu Rwanda bikunda kwibandaho? Kubera 
iki?..........................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................... 
VI	  
	  
3. Is there any freedom of speech and freedom of expression in Rwanda?  Ese mu Rwanda 
haba hari  Ubwisanzure bw’itangfazamakuru n’ubwisanzure mu gutanga 
ibitekerezo?............................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
........................................... 
4. What are the main constraints media and media practitioners undergo regarding press 
freedom and freedom of expression? Ni ibihe bibazo itangazamakuru ryo mu Rwanda 
n’abanyamakuru bakorera mu Rwanda bakunze guhura na byo ku bijyanye 
n’ubwisanzure bw’itangazamakuru n’ubwo kwisanzura mu bitekerezo?.............................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
......................................... 
5. What should be done to overcome those constraints? Hakorwa iki se kugira ngo ibi 
bibazo bikemuke?...................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................... 
6. Are there any confronting laws regarding press freedom and freedom of speech? Explain/ 
Ese amategeko y’u Rwanda haba hari aho abangamira ubwisanzure bw’itangazamakuru 
n’ubwisanzure mu gutanga ibitekerezo? Sobanura……………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………….. 
VII	  
	  
7. Could media censorship by the Government or self censorship help in  reunifying 
Rwandans? Ese kugenzura itangazamakuru cyane/kuriniga hari icyo byakongera ku 
mubanire y’Abanyarwanda?..................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................... 
8. Can that censorship improve the social welfare of people? How?/ Kugenzura cyane 
itangazamakuru cg kuriniga byaba hari icyo byafasha mu mibereho myiza y’abaturage? 
Gute?......................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................. 
9. Keeping in mind the role of hate media in the Genocide against Tutsi, do you think it is 
time to let people in Rwanda express freely? / Utirengagije uruhare rw’itangaamakuru 
ribiba urwanga muri Jenoside yakorewe abatutsi, utekeraza ko igihe cyaba kigeze kugira 
ngo abantu bisanzure mu gutanga ibitekerezo?....................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................ 
 
 
Thanks for your participation! 
 
 
 
VIII	  
	  
 
Questionnaire for media houses 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. The information you provide is confidential and 
very important in helping to appraise “Speech Freedom and Press Freedom in Human Security in 
in  Rwanda”. Your answer could contribute to make Rwanda a better place. Thank you for your 
participation. 
Name………….(optional)                                                Age………. 
Profession……….                                                             Experience…… 
Nationality…….. 
Questions 
1. What is freedom of expression in relation to your work? 
…..…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………….. 
 
2.  Are you free to fully publish anything that your reporters deem news worthy? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………… 
3.  Have you received any censorship or limitations from authorities 
before?....................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................ 
IX	  
	  
4. If yes, what was your experience? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………… 
5. What policies, if any, do you follow in your coverage of events? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………… 
6.  If not, how do you cover your events especially political stories? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………. 
7. Do you have a chance to freely express your views on this forum without any 
limitation?..............................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................. 
8. Have you ever been subjected to any censorship or legal limitations hindering you from 
publishing freely either from the law or the government? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………….…………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………. 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
	  
 
